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TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND PROTECTION OF
OUR SOCIETY: A JURISGENERATIVE TAIL
Gregory H. Bigler*
Abstract
This Article organizes thoughts from a long period of work and life
exploring some of what uniquely guides traditional Euchee and Muscogee
society. My participation in Euchee ceremonial life is a lens by which I
view tribal, federal, and human rights law and processes. I hope to begin
articulating a modern traditional Indian jurisprudence and find some
source(s) to aid in preservation of Native society. In order to truly reform
federal Indian law, not only must traditional tribal jurisprudence be
acknowledged, but the processes used by ceremonial people must be
understood and utilized in a transformative effort. I am informed by
discussions with friends from other tribes who hold similar beliefs to my
Euchee people; I write from the perspective, however, of a Polecat Euchee
ceremonial stomp ground member. I believe the validity of my observations
depends upon tribal specificity, meaning I do not simply refer to “Indian”
traditions but rather to Euchee, Muscogee, or Shawnee traditions.
Traditional jurisprudence must be a foundation of the current
international indigenous1 rights efforts regarding sacred sites and artifacts,
* J.D., Harvard Law School (1985); LL.M., Wisconsin Law School (1987); District
Judge, Muscogee (Creek) Nation; Attorney General, Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma. Thank
you to the stomp dance people who shared stories; to my Euchee elders who shared what
Euchee society has to offer; my Chiefs and Speakers, living and deceased; my Euchee
language mentors (unfortunately all deceased); Prof. Kristen Carpenter for her comments;
and, my deceased mentor, partner, and friend, Prof. G. William Rice, with whom I spent
years discussing these issues. And lastly, to my mother, Josephine Wildcat Bigler, who
shared so much insight and way of thinking about our people, much of it without me
realizing.
1. Under international law, “indigenous” is not well defined: “In the thirty-year history
of indigenous issues at the United Nations, and the longer history in the ILO on this
question, considerable thinking and debate have been devoted to the question of definition of
‘indigenous peoples,’ but no such definition has ever been adopted by any UN-system
body.” Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Dep’t of Econ. & Soc.
Affairs, Workshop on Data Collection and Disaggregation for Indigenous Peoples: The
Concept of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 1, U.N. DOC. PFII/2004/WS.1/3 (2004). In this Article, I
use “Indian,” “tribes,” “nations,” “Native American,” and “indigenous” interchangeably. To
some extent, these are all external definitions, as my mother, born in 1921, used to
sometimes say, “I grew up as an Indian, but really I am just Euchee.”
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religious practices, and culture. If Indian advocates are unable to articulate
what we believe and the nature of the society being destroyed, it is more
difficult to argue for its continuity.2 More importantly, we must be able to
explain to ourselves what we believe, teaching our own people and
incorporating those beliefs into our tribal institutions. Doing so will ensure
an indigenous based social-legal system that carries us into the future. I
hope this process will also be of interest to my friends and colleagues
exploring federal Indian law3 and international human rights.4
I. Introduction
This act [the Curtis Act], passed in 1898, abolished tribal laws
and courts, thus fulfilling the fears of Crazy Snake. Matters came
quickly to a head. In 1900 the Creek nation agreed to allot its
lands, thereby consenting to the Curtis Act . . . . In 1901 they
[the full blood faction] proclaimed him [Crazy Snake] their
hereditary chief. Harjo at once called a national council of the
House of Kings and the House of Warriors at Hickory Ground,
six miles from Henryetta. The council proclaimed the
reestablishment of the ancient laws and courts acknowledged by
the United States in the treaty of 1825. In so doing they
challenged the authority of the United States to dissolve the
government of another nation, and appealed to the sanctity of
treaties.5
Chitto Harjo, also known as Crazy Snake, was a Muscogee Heneha6
from Hickory Ground. Between the 1890s and 1900s, he led the Muscogee
2. When I use the word “we,” I refer to Euchee and Muscogee and to those of us who
participate, belong, or reside within traditional Native American societies or communities.
3. Federal Indian law generally refers to the body of law promulgated by federal courts
and Congress as it impacts Native Americans and Indian tribes. This tends to be distinct
from tribal law, which refers to the cases, statutes, and internal laws of tribal courts and
governments.
4. See G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
5. Mace Davis, Chitto Harjo, 13 CHRONS. OKLA. 139, 142 (1935), https://cdm17279.
contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p17279coll4/id/4756/page/0/inline/p17279coll4_47
56_0.
6. A chief at Muscogee ceremonial grounds is called a Meko (plural Mekvlke). A
Heneha is the second chief, or helper, and one who often speaks for the Meko. Tvstenvke is
the head warrior. Meko is commonly used when speaking about both Muscogee and Euchee
chiefs. (The Euchee word for chief is B’a-thlae.) The Meko is ultimately responsible for all
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resistance to the allotment of tribal land and the attempted destruction of the
tribal government by the United States. These warriors fought to stop those
cooperating with the allotment process, hiding in the hills of eastern
Oklahoma when the United States Marshals came after them. The stance
Chitto Harjo took, the source from which he drew his determination, the
values and arguments he made, and his adherence to the “ancient laws” and
insistence upon respect for tribal government still offer lessons today to the
Muscogee and Euchee people and other advocates. Our past traditions
remain alive and a part of our society today. These traditions continue in
ceremonies and in other more modern ways that still originate in our past.
These lessons and stories form a basis for discovering a traditional tribal
jurisprudence.7
Within the Euchee, Muscogee, Cherokee and Shawnee, the stomp dances
are part of a still-existing traditional religion. Ceremonies and spirituality
among the Euchee, and similarly among the Muscogee, Shawnee, and
Cherokee, cross both tribal and linguistic boundaries. At one recent dance, I
began thinking of the significant number of Euchee and Muscogee that
attend these dances and how little others, even other Indians, know about
the existence of our stomp dance religion. These thoughts led to the
realization that while our stomp dance represents a complex, nuanced
philosophy and way of life that contains a native jurisprudence, there is
little of it represented in the code of laws of the Muscogee Nation. Why do
we not have more in our legal structure? Ceremonial people are told to lead
our life pursuant to the strictures of our ceremonies. If true, then perhaps we
need to better articulate among ourselves what those strictures are as a
activities within the grounds and sees that the annual ceremonies are done properly. As such,
these Mekvlke generally hold a position of great respect within their nation, as they are
responsible for keeping the nation tied to its history and culture. For simplicity’s sake, I will
usually refer to the traditional chiefs, Muscogee and Euchee, with the term Mekvlke.
7. While jurisprudence has many definitions, the one from Cornell Law School’s Legal
Information Institute fits the intended meaning herein:
The word jurisprudence derives from the Latin term juris prudentia, which
means “the study, knowledge, or science of law.” In the United States
jurisprudence commonly means the philosophy of law . . . .
....
. . . The third type of jurisprudence seeks to reveal the historical, moral, and
cultural basis of a particular legal concept.
. . . The fourth body of jurisprudence focuses on finding the answer to such
abstract questions as “What is law?” and “How do judges (properly) decide
cases?”
Jurisprudence, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
jurisprudence (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
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system of law. Without this internal clarity, it will be difficult for our own
people to incorporate our ways into our laws. Further, unless we insist upon
the use of process in which those societal commandments are developed
and transmitted, an important indigenous institution is lost even as we argue
for its continuance. For example, the use of long form narration as a means
of explanation must be respected through use, not just token
acknowledgement.8
In their seminal work, Karl N. Llewellyn and Adamson Hobel explored
the “law-ways among primitive peoples.”9 They importantly noted that
American Indian societies had complex laws if one only knew where to
look; namely, the cultural ways of the people. Through this type of inquiry,
scholars could discern examples of law falling into several categories:
The one road is ideological and goes to “rules” which are felt as
proper for channeling and controlling behavior . . . . The second
road is descriptive; it deals with practice. It explores the patterns
according to which behavior actually occurs. The third road is a
search for instances of hitch, dispute, grievance, trouble; and
inquiry into what trouble was and what was done about it.10
This articulation of law meshes with my own developing perspective.11
However, instead of being an outsider looking to see if we have law, I am
realizing what I (or we) already know is law. There have been other works
looking at traditional native societies to see what constitutes their laws.
These works tend to be academic investigations conducted by outsiders,
such as Llewellyn and Hobel. Very few commentaries are generated from
tribal perspectives.12 Despite now having several decades of written tribal
8. The means by which this occurs is utilized throughout this Article both as
illustration and as a mechanism that hopefully gives cultural context to the topic(s)
discussed.
9. KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND
CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE viii (1941). Hopefully, the term “primitive” is no
longer used.
10. Id. at 20–21.
11. I purposely use “developing perspective” because after three years of law school
and a lifetime of law practice, it takes considerable and conscious effort to approach matters
from a non-Anglo-American jurisprudential view. As told to me by one Kickapoo, “Going to
school makes you white. You speak English and forget your language. You go to work and
neglect your ceremonies. You learn about America and forget your tribe.”
12. On the outsider spectra, of note are LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 9 (legal
scholar and anthropologist, respectively, looking at Cheyenne oral stories for sources of
Cheyenne law); and JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION: THE LANGUAGE OF
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court decisions, there is a scarcity of discussions, either conducted by
Indians or otherwise, of how a tribal government sees itself.13 Fewer still
look under the skin to see what the original veins of tribal jurisprudence
reveal or where they might be located.14 I approach this Article from the
perspective of a member of the Polecat Euchee Ceremonial Ground.15 This
means much of what is contained herein is not found by citation to
scholarly articles but rather comes from personal conversations or, more
often, stories told to me as a member of the Euchee community, ceremonial
LAW IN HOPI TRIBAL COURT (2008) (linguistic analysis of Hopi Court’s uses of traditions).
Examples of the internal perspective are Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the
Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian
Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191 (2001) (arguing a need to use cultural sovereignty
based on traditions); and RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW
(2009) (Navajo jurist looking at Navajo judicial systems’ use of traditions). These stand as
markers against the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883),
which concerned the Lakota Crow Dog murder of another Lakota (and which was resolved
within Lakota traditional law). The case did not address in any manner the internal Lakota
right to their own justice system independent of the federal courts:
The federal attorney for Dakota Territory was aghast at the seemingly casual
manner in which the Sioux dealt with this killing, and he soon charged Crow
Dog with murder. The case reached the Supreme Court in 1883, and the
conviction of Crow Dog by the territorial court was reversed on the grounds
that the 1868 treaty had preserved for the Sioux the right to punish tribal
members who had committed serious crimes.
VINE DELORIA JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY loc. 102-104 (2013) (Kindle ebook). Ultimately, Crow Dog
led to the passage of the Major Crimes Act (Act of Mar. 3, 1885), § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385, that
foisted federal criminal jurisdiction upon Indians on their reservations.
13. There is now a small but growing body of literature discussing tribal law. See
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW (2011); SARAH DEER & CECILIA
KNAPP, Muscogee Constitutional Jurisprudence: Vhakv Em Pvtakv (The Carpet Under the
Law), 49 TULSA L. REV. 125, 126 (2013).
14. See JOHN BORROWS (KEGEDONCE), DRAWING OUT LAW: A SPIRIT’S GUIDE (2010) for
a Canadian example that utilizes indigenous storytelling about Native life to explore
indigenous jurisprudence.
15. The “ceremonial grounds,” “stomp grounds,” or “grounds” are the terms generally
used to refer to the thirteen to fifteen historic tribal towns, or entities, that continue to exist
within the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. These now primarily carry forward their ceremonial
functions, whereas they originally functioned as both political and ceremonial entities. Jason
Jackson tries to explain their current role by use of analogy to a congregation. JASON BAIRD
JACKSON, YUCHI FOLKLORE: CULTURAL EXPRESSION IN A SOUTHEASTERN NATIVE AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 157 (2013) (with contributions by Mary S. Linn). While perhaps not incorrect,
that term may too easily lead outsiders to not comprehend the much fuller societal role the
grounds or towns still hold and which can still be a source of law.
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grounds, and society.16 To be clear, I am not speaking for or on behalf of
my ground since my chief has not directed me to do so. Additionally, while
I am an active participant of my ground, and I try to write from what I have
learned, there are others who know as much or more about our ceremonial
ways. However, I have thought about these things in terms of law.
Ironically, this work is a contradiction to the common assertion among our
ceremonial leaders that to understand our “ways” (meaning ceremonial and
spiritual), one must be present to participate and see rather than read or
write about it.17 Nonetheless, in order to aid me in making semblance of
what I have learned and to develop appropriate argument, I lay out in
writing my understanding of certain ceremonial precepts.
II. The Setting
A. What We Had
At the time of contact between the Americas and Europe in 1492, there
were advanced civilizations throughout the Americas.18 While most
attention in popular culture is devoted to the great Central and South
American civilizations of the Aztec, Incas, and Mayas, North America also
had great towns and societies. There were the organized societies of the
16. The author notes some confusion over the use of the form of the term “ground” or
“grounds”. When speaking with ceremonial members, they tend to freely use both forms
when referring to the “stomp-ground” or “stomp-grounds”. I inquired about this with Amos
McNac, Heles Hayv (medicine maker) at Nvyaka, and Meko George Thompson of Hickory
Grounds, both also Supreme Court justices at the Muscogee Nation. Justice McNac noted
that in Mvskoke he was Wotkovlke, racoon clan. Vlke is the plural form, that even though he
was just one person, one was always part of a group and thus the plural was used. With the
grounds they used etvlwvlke, the plural form of tribal town. Again, they explained that a
person could not be a singular, but rather was always one of a group. I suspect that when the
ceremonial members began using English this linguistic nuance was simply carried over
from the native language. This too shows how even a simple exploration of traditional
terminology can lead to understanding of indigenous conceptions.
17. Perhaps the single most common theme shared by the Euchee, Muscogee, and
Cherokee grounds that I have visited is that “being Indian is hard.” The manner in which we
must carry out our ways is strict and difficult. The former speaker at my grounds, Newman
Littlebear, who passed away in 2015, was a well-respected elder. He was fond of the saying,
“We dance at night because at 4 a.m. the flesh is weak and the spirit is strong.” One can only
truly understand the spiritual truth of those words if one is sitting under the arbors at 4 a.m.,
struggling to stay awake, while watching a man forty years one’s elder dance and sing.
18. See CHARLES C. MANN, 1491: NEW REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS BEFORE
COLUMBUS (2d ed. 2005) (covering in detail the history, societies, and cultures of the
Americas just before Columbus’s arrival in the Americas).
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great mound cultures of the Muscogee in the southeast and those in the
Ohio River valley.19 Grand cities could be found near Cahokia, Illinois, the
Caddo villages in present Arkansas,20 and the recently rediscovered vast
Wichita Indian town in Kansas.21 Agricultural innovation and trade moved
goods thousands of miles between tribes and towns.22 That, however, all
went away for various reasons, not the least of which was disease. Our
oldest Euchee stories tell that at one time there were 40,000 Euchee. There
is neither record nor document to support this figure.23 However, assuming
19. Id. at 252-59.
20. Mann describes Hernando De Soto’s 1539 expedition through what would become
the southern United States. De Soto marched “into what is now eastern Arkansas, a land
‘thickly set with great towns’ . . . ‘two or three of them to be seen from one.’” Id. at 98.
Mann also notes another Spanish conquistador, Las Casas (circa 1542), to whom “the
Americas seemed so thick with people ‘that it looked as if God ha[d] placed all of or the
greater part of the entire human race in these countries.’” Id. at 132.
21. A news article noting the believed finding of a Wichita Indian city in present Kansas
that was the site of a 1601 battle with the Spaniards stated: “‘The Spaniards were amazed by
the size of Etzanoa,’ Blakeslee said. ‘They counted 2,000 houses that could hold 10 people
each. They said it would take two or three days to walk through it all.’” Roy Wenzl, Lost
City Found: Etzanoa of the Great Wichita Nation, WICHITA EAGLE (Apr. 17, 2017, 12:20
AM), http://www.kansas.com/news/state/article144968264.html#storylin\K; see also Frank
Morris, Kansas Archaeologist Rediscovers Lost Native American City, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(May 10, 2017, 4:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/05/10/527817921/kansas-archaeologistrediscovers-lost-native-american-city.
22. See FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM AND THE
CANT OF CONQUEST 85 (1975) (noting northern Michigan copper was found in Jamestown,
Virginia, and obsidian was found over 1700 miles away from its source). In another
example, Grand Island, on Lake Superior just off the northern coast of Michigan’s upper
peninsula, covers some 13,000 acres. “Indian agent Henry Rowe Schoolcraft reported . . .
that a population of fifty-seven Ojibwe Indians from thirteen families were producing 3,500
pounds of maple sugar in 600 kettles (Schoolcraft 1851).” Matthew M. Thomas & Janet M.
Silbernagel, The Evolution of a Maple Sugaring Landscape on Lake Superior’s Grand
Island, 35 MICH. ACADEMICIAN 135, 138, 140 (2003) (emphasis added).
23. There is, though, a di’ile (traditional Euchee story) about “How Wolves Came to
Be” that begins with an old woman going to a village that is empty except for a crying baby
boy. Knowing the high mortality rate the tribes experienced at the time of contact with
Europeans, one wonders if the beginning of this Di’ile somehow memorializes those losses.
Mann notes a similar situation in the Pacific Northwest in 1792. European explorer George
Vancouver found in the Puget Sound area “deserted villages, abandoned fishing boats,
human remains ‘promiscuously scattered about the beach, in great numbers,’” suggesting the
area saw a precipitous decrease in Native American population, having recently (circa 1790)
been far more populous. MANN, supra note 18, at 110. Thus, the European account and
Euchee account seem to be in accord as to Native American population decline, though
approached from different sources. The ascribing of greater validity to one account over the
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small pox and other diseases ran through the Euchee like many other tribes,
especially those that were closest to the first European contact, a ninety-five
percent loss is not unreasonable.24 That puts the Euchee in line with where
we were at the time of written records regarding contact: 500 gun men
(warriors), meaning around 2000 total men, women, and children.25 Thus,
as illustrated by the trade of goods, diplomacy, and numbers of people,
these were not isolated but rather interactive, vibrant societies. More
importantly for the discussion that follows, we are unlikely to resurrect
those self-sustaining societies that existed at the time of contact. Creating a
society independent of the larger society around us is not the goal.26 Rather,
the desire is to have a society that retains distinct attributes derived from
our past, which allows continuity of our unique culture and society. We
must therefore understand what obstacles we face and what allows us the
greatest chance of success. Of course, a fundamental question is this: what
are we trying to continue, and how can we determine the nature of our
remaining society?

other due to its source goes to the heart of devaluing indigenous forms of history and
society.
24. See id. at 107-49. Mann notes some academics argue such high loss figures is
simply revisionist history. However, as Mann notes by citing the original European
explorers’/conquistadors’ journals, the high death rates are actually re-revisionist history as
the 1500-1700 descriptions are of a land teaming with people, settlements, and life. See id. at
15-27 (laying out a case for at least ninety percent population loss).
25. The “500 gun men” derives from William Bartram of Philadelphia (1791), who
believed the total Euchee population was 1000-1500. FRANK G. SPECK, ETHNOLOGY OF THE
YUCHI INDIANS 7 (Univ. of Neb. Press 2004) (1909). Assuming a gun man was a male
between the age of sixteen to sixty years, that would imply a possible wife, minor children,
or sisters and elderly for each gun man, meaning a 2000 total seems more plausible for 500
“soldiers.” These are guesses, given that only seven years later in 1798-99, the Yuchi were
listed as having 250 gun men in three villages. COL. BENJAMIN HAWKINS, CREEK
CONFEDERACY AND A SKETCH OF THE CREEK COUNTRY 62 (Savannah, Ga. Historical Soc’y
1848), https://archive.org/details/creekconfederacy31hawk/page/n127. Regardless, by the
time of allotment in 1906, the population of Yuchi clustered in three settlements was
estimated by Speck at no more than 500 total. SPECK, supra, at 9.
26. This seems reflected in the fear of states during the drafting of the UNDRIP, i.e.,
that indigenous peoples would seek to secede from member states. See Dalee Sambo
Dorough, Rough Drafts: A Personal Account of the 25-Year Struggle to Craft the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 34 WORLD POL’Y J., Winter 2017/2018, at
46. Here, as in the UNDRIP, the real goal is self-determination with native societies
retaining our unique identity, culture, and society.
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The Euchee (also spelled Yuchi) are a tribe of Indians included within
the Muscogee (Creek) Nation.27 Mary Linn, Phd., Curator of Cultural and
Linguistic Revitalization at the Smithsonian Center for Folklife and
Cultural Heritage, has noted that Euchee is a language unrelated to any
other language.28 Despite being affiliated with the Muscogee since the late
1700s, we have strongly maintained our unique identity separate and apart
from the Muscogee. We are a stomp dance people, referring to our
ceremonial dance cycle. This ceremony includes the main Green Corn
dance that, in various forms, was once common among not only the Euchee
and Muscogee, but many other Eastern Woodlands tribes. At least with
tribes now residing within Oklahoma, the Green Corn and stomp dance
remains strongest, perhaps, among the Muscogee and Euchee. The Euchee
stomp dance and Green Corn ceremony has a similar (though not identical)
religious and ceremonial structure as the Muscogee and our friends, the
Shawnee and Cherokee. This is despite those three tribes coming from three
linguistic groups: Muscogean, Algonquin, and Iroquoian, unrelated to
Euchee or each other.29 There are differences due to language and culture,
and while we each notice these differences amongst ourselves, outsiders
might not. The differences can be significant, yet discussions between
members of the host grounds and visiting grounds during dance season not
only further understanding of our own ways but are a significant factor in
each of us reaffirming a commitment and, importantly, an ability to
continue our practices.30
27. Muscogee refers to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the Muscogee people, also
referred to as Creeks. The Muscogee were comprised of numerous tribal towns with similar
or related languages, including the Hitchiti, Alabama, and Coushita. The language has been
written since the mid-1800s and is most often spelled “Mvskoke.”
28. See SPECK, supra note 25, at 6; see also JACKSON, supra note 15, at 44 (“Yuchi is
one of only a small number of language ‘isolates’ (a term used for a language that is not
demonstrably related to any known language) still spoken in the Americas and the only one
still surviving in the eastern part of the continent. This singular achievement, signaling an
ancient history as a people and a power of cultural resilience into the present, has meant that
the Yuchi have long captured the interest of scholars.”).
29. YUCHI INDIAN HISTORIES BEFORE THE REMOVAL ERA loc. 345 (Jason Baird Jackson
ed., 2012) (Kindle ebook).
30. During one of our dances some years ago, a Meko, now deceased, from a Muscogee
ground was drinking coffee at one of our camps. He asked if we knew why he always came
to our grounds, even when Muscogee grounds were dancing. He said he was told by his
elders that a long time ago his old people and the Euchee were visiting and they saw a day
coming when neither would be able to carry on by themselves. So, they decided to let each
other know when each were dancing and to come and assist. He said others have forgotten
that, but he remembered and felt a duty to carry on that commitment. (From the context and
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These ways, practices, ceremonies, or religions are often called “our
traditions.” As used here, “traditions” refer to those elements in Native
society that have a continuity with the tribe’s heritage.31 Jason Jackson’s
observation in Yuchi Folklore accurately describes one end of a trap which
many outsiders fall into of “inadvertently perpetuating the long-established
stereotype in which Native peoples are seen as quintessentially
traditional—that is, as living ideal-types governed only by custom.”32
Alternatively, some outsiders, particularly academics, argue many Indians’
traditions are actually modern constructions, not being “true,” exact
derivations from pre-existing tribal practices.33 However, as Jackson
explains about the Euchee:

language, it was understood this occurred very long ago, perhaps sometime after removal in
the 1830s or even before.) From such actions, relations and duties arise between peoples.
31. “Traditional” is, at best, a fuzzy term. Natives frequently use it and can usually
emotionally agree as to what it means. Others have noted “traditional” “is imprecise and
open to interpretation.” Kristen A. Carpenter, Individual Religious Freedoms in American
Indian Tribal Constitutional Law, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 159, 195 n.25
(Kristen A. Carpenter, Matthew L. M. Fletcher & Angela R. Riley eds., 2012). I am not
particularly concerned about defining Euchee traditions; rather, I simply want to talk about
Euchee traditions.
32. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 74.
33. For instance, Richland discusses academics who seek to find the “true” traditions to
which they deem themselves “uniquely” qualified to decide upon:
The use of notions of invented tradition to analyze the contemporary activities
of American Indian, Hawaiian, Maori, and other indigenous peoples . . . has
resulted in direct and difficult conflicts between such communities and
scholars . . . . [T]hese conflicts fundamentally turn on the question of
authenticity, the authority to authenticate, and the roles that analysts and
communities play, respectively, in processes of representation.
RICHLAND, supra note 12, at 150 (citations omitted). While Richland’s analysis is all too
accurate, it is also true that false claims to traditions, or perhaps more accurately, false
claims to rights to traditions, are a problem increasingly facing and costing Indian nations.
Ben Barnes, Second Chief of the Shawnee Tribe located in northeast Oklahoma, has
committed effort to exposing false claims of those he calls “Pre-tendians” that put on fake
Shawnee ceremonies, as well as attempt to intervene at historic Shawnee sites and in
repatriation issues of returning Shawnee ancestors and cultural patrimony to the proper place
and people:
Between the years of 2007 and 2010, more than l00 million dollars went to just
26 non-recognized groups calling themselves a tribe. Fake tribes have even
created problems with their misuse of federal funding such as recruiting
children in Arkansas school systems to enroll as “native children” so that the
school could receive Johnson O' Malley (JOM) and Title 7 Indian Education
support funds.
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Tradition is evoked everywhere, from difficult arguments about
religion or economic development to the planning of grandma's
upcoming birthday party . . . . When the Yuchi and their
neighbors discuss the nature and practices of their heritage
culture, particularly the performance of their collective
ceremonies, they explicitly frame such activity in processual
terms, identifying it as a special and valued kind of "work." Thus
they represent communities predisposed to a dynamic rather than
essential theory of tradition.34
Jackson’s use of “dynamic” is perhaps the most important conceptual point,
being that to us traditions are living.
While there are inter-tribal activities among many tribes, I am not herein
looking at generic or pan-Indian traditions.35 When discussing mechanisms
that flow from tribal ceremonial traditions, I perceive those religious
activities of tribally-specific derivation. That is not to downplay the
borrowed or incorporated elements from other sources into a tribal culture.
Traditions may be partly or heavily influenced by other societies or
cultures, including Anglo-American, Hispanic, or most especially, other
tribes.
In the Euchee and Muscogee tribes, the more traditional members
participate in stomp dances. Some Euchee, even though participating in
traditional dances, have also become members of the Native American
Church, part of the Peyote religion. The Euchee were historically a very
conservative element within the Muscogee Nation, which, combined with
the difficulty of outsiders learning our language, meant Christianity came
late to us. Not until 1901 did the Methodist missionaries finally see Pickett
Chapel founded just south of Sapulpa, Oklahoma. The church preached
primarily in Euchee until the 1970s and, at least occasionally through the
1980s, and still sings Euchee hymns. More importantly, despite Pickett
Chapel having until recent years a public avoidance of the Euchee
ceremonial dances, the church held traditional funerals while the tribe still
Benjamin J. Barnes, Faux Indians, Their Threat, and Tribal Responses 8 (paper presented at
the Muscogee (Creek) Nation District Court CLE Conference, “Doing Business in Indian
Country,” Apr. 28, 2016) (on file with author).
34. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 75 (emphasis added).
35. Again, these observations come from participation in Euchee society and ceremonial
cycle and are not based upon academic observations or analysis. While pow-wows and like
gatherings may have originated with specific tribes, when they are now hosted by Cherokees
or Muscogees (or some inter-tribal organization), they obviously are not in that iteration a
tribally specific ceremony.
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had Indian doctors to conduct them36 and still occasionally used the
traditional medicine to wash after funerals held at Pickett Chapel.37
Interestingly, as the number of native Euchee speakers dwindled to a
handful, the remaining speakers were primarily elderly female members of
Pickett Chapel. Some Muscogee churches are still able to preach in
Mvskoke, though with the aging of Mvskoke speakers there are fewer full
services conducted in the language. The Muscogee are likely soon to be in
the same situation as the Euchee.38 Yet other Muscogee and Euchees know
little to nothing of their culture or ways, traditional or otherwise.
“Modern traditional” is seemingly contradictory but must be a
foundational principle if a Native society is to continue as a living society,
as opposed to a museum piece. Traditional Native society infers values and
practices derived from the past. However, no society survived by remaining
stagnant. Adaptation in some areas is necessary to exist and grow. A small
example of this is the creation of new words in Native languages for things
such as cars: yabithlo – also a wagon, literally “wood going round”; also
k'as'ædicha – “something that is fast.” The foregoing examples illustrate
36. The Euchee tend to refer (in English) to these people as “doctors,” being people who
were formally trained pursuant to Euchee traditional practices. They knew the plants,
medicines, and songs to treat people for physical and spiritual ailments. Other tribes often
referred to them as “medicine men.” The last of these Euchee doctors passed away in the late
1960s or early 1970s.
37. In the late 1990s, a form of crisis arose at Pickett Chapel when my uncle wished to
have the traditional Euchee medicine to wash with after a funeral. Some members were
against allowing it, perhaps because they thought it was not appropriate to have traditional
Euchee doings at a church, despite having done so for nearly ninety years. Ultimately, the
medicine was used and continues at Pickett. This illustrates the process of assimilation and
suppression that occurs within the Euchee community and elsewhere. Internally, this
dynamic is different than when knowledge is either lost or is no longer able to be carried
forward. How these internal tribal decisions come about probably has jurisprudential
lessons, but I have not yet worked through them. Sometimes, their meaning does not become
clear until a similar situation next arises.
38. Many of these Muscogee churches came from Methodist and Baptist missionaries
and were grouped out of former tribal towns or ceremonial grounds. Thus, you have fifty or
more Muscogee churches, including Alabama Coushatta, Concharty, Big Cussetah,
Greenleaf, and Okfuskey. All of these came out of tribal towns. Even while no longer
knowing much about the stomp grounds, many of these churches incorporate stomp dance
structures into their services, such as where men and women sit and the use of a “stickman”
to sit people or assist. Many of these same Indian churches used to, and some perhaps still
do, consider the stomp grounds as evil and try to persuade people from such dances, perhaps
as a result of the missionaries’ work to convert the “heathen” Indians in the 1800s and early
1900s. Conversely, some Muscogee Indian churches have recently hosted social or
fundraiser stomp dances, upsetting some of the more conservative grounds’ Mekvlke.
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adaptation and incorporation but also how even those can fade with time or
dilution of tribal ties.
To my developing perspective, traditions might best be understood by
reference to the Mvskoke term “emayetv,” which, as explained to me when
translated into English, means “this is what I was taught” and infers “this is
my ways.” The Muscogee do not have direct terms for tradition, culture, or
society, but rather discuss “those things that we were taught, (that are our
ways) which have been handed down to us.”39 This concept perhaps best
embodies what I mean herein as to traditional society. Determining what
core values and practices cannot be given up if the traditional society is to
remain true to itself is often the tricky part of the traditional equation.
Nonetheless, what is traditional is quintessentially the tribe’s decision.
B. Traditional Rights as the Canary for Indigenous Rights40
Two of the overarching issues in Indian Country are reaffirming political
sovereignty and economic development. However, as David Comingdeer,
Chief of the Cherokee Echota Ceremonial Grounds near Tahlequah,
Oklahoma, puts it, political sovereignty flows from cultural sovereignty.41
They must stand together—tribal leaders of today owe their existence to the
culture. Wallace Coffee and Rebecca Tsosie wrote about this issue in 2001,
asserting that “cultural sovereignty is a process of reclaiming culture and of
building nations.”42 Their article notes the threat Indian nations face
regarding the possibility of complete annihilation of their political status.43
They see cultural sovereignty as valuable because it would be an internally
generated doctrine that could address the increasing loss of language,
39. This is at least according to the Mekvlke who worked on the Mvskoke translation of
the UNDRIP.
40. Felix S. Cohen, the father of Indian law scholars, wrote the often-used analogy:
It is a pity that so many Americans today think of the Indian as a romantic or
comic figure in American history without contemporary significance. In fact,
the Indian plays much the same role in our American society that the Jews
played in Germany. Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shifts from
fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians,
even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our
democratic faith.
Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62
YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
41. This idea has been discussed in personal conversations and was also expressed by
Chief Comingdeer in a series of conference calls hosted by the author in 2017 to discuss the
UNDRIP and how to implement it domestically.
42. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 12, at 191.
43. Id. at 194.
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ceremonies, and way of life.44 In contradistinction, Sam Deloria, disavows,
in part, the use of culture as a basis of asserting tribal sovereignty. In a 2006
article, Deloria notes three federal bases for support of tribal political
sovereignty: inherent tribal rights, cultural distinctiveness, and general
poverty of the tribes.45 Deloria opines to the extent tribes pin their
sovereignty arguments too much upon poverty or culture, if that poverty or
culture disappears, the arguments for sovereignty may also disappear.46
Thus, Deloria writes that while tribal advocates may have a responsibility to
their culture, they should not tie themselves too closely to cultural
arguments because it could lead to courts requiring tribal culture to be static
in order to affirm tribal sovereignty.47 That, however, is a trap that
opponents already spring upon tribal rights.48 Many traditional people have
always believed their core is cultural and their tribal existence flows from
that culture. To argue traditional people must not assert this point for fear of
losing their political identity is, in essence, to tell them they must
accommodate away their core beliefs by not emphasizing that their culture
equals existence.49 The proper response, though, is not one of fear of the
argument about ossified traditions but of understanding ourselves so that we
may articulate why it is wrong.
44. Id. at 196.
45. Sam Deloria, New Paradigm: Indian Tribes in the Land of Unintended
Consequences, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 301, 303 (2006) [hereinafter Sam Deloria].
46. Id. at 303-04.
47. Id. at 313-14. Both Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 12, and Sam Deloria, supra note
45, were written before the UNDRIP was adopted in 2007. The Declaration reframed
indigenous rights into indigenous peoples’ inherent rights to exist in terms of human rights.
Thus, an exterior source now exists that does not contain the traps found in confining oneself
to arguments created by the federal system. Of course, the UNDRIP is not positively adopted
domestic law at this time. However, it does, as discussed at Part V, offer possibilities.
48. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013)
(No. 12-399) (raising by way of racial classification arguments inferencing lack of sufficient
cultural identity) (“Where an Indian child is eligible for tribal membership simply because of
her blood lineage, ICWA is triggered by the child’s racial status unmoored to tribal
sovereignty, culture, or politics.” (emphasis added)).
49. Note the federal courts still regularly cite nineteenth century cases for support of
positions which had as their basis the goal of social engineering of Indian society. “Congress
in the late nineteenth century adopted ‘the view that the Indians tribes should abandon their
nomadic lives on the communal reservations and settle into an agrarian economy on
privately-owned parcels of land.’” Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 919 (2017) (quoting
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984)). Not only is such social engineering wrong, but
it is ironic because the indigenous peoples of North America had been among the greatest
farmers the world ever saw until destruction of their agrarian economy by the Europeans up
to and through the removals commencing in the 1830s.
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As to assertion of economic development rights in Indian Country,50
such rights are likely better received than assertion of traditional cultural or
spiritual rights.51 First, American society firmly falls within the capitalist
structure. Both Congress and federal courts understand business or
economic arguments, even when framed within Indian Country. That does
not mean arguments for tribal economic rights free from state interference
will prevail. Tribes, however, are able to use existing laws to assert such
rights.52 The history of American law is replete with business and economic
50. Indian Country is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151. This codified the Supreme Court’s
existing common law classifications of Indian Country in the Act of June 25, 1948, which
states:
[T]he term “Indian country”, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rightsof-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 1151, 62 Stat. 683, 757. This term of art is used
to define where, generally, federal and tribal jurisdiction holds sway as opposed to state
jurisdiction. Perhaps the earliest definition of "Indian Country" was by statute in the Act of
June 30, 1834: "all that part of the United States . . . to which the Indian title has not been
extinguished." Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (1834). Felix Cohen
explained the effect of the early Indian country legislation was that: “Indian country in all
these statutes is territory, wherever situated, within which tribal law is generally applicable,
federal law is applicable only in special cases designated by statute, and state law is not
applicable at all.” FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 6 (1941),
http://thorpe.ou.edu/cohen/chapter1.pdf.
51. This is also shown by articles such as Angela R. Riley & Kristen A. Carpenter,
Owning Red: A Theory of Indian (Cultural) Appropriation, 94 TEX. L. REV. 859 (2016), and
Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and
Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 299 (2002), which together argue for a new approach to
American property law to account for traditional perspectives on property and cultural
possessions. The necessity for such arguments necessarily illustrates that the current
dominant property structure does not accommodate alternative conceptions of cultural
property.
52. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993) (Tribe may
license car tags within its jurisdiction); McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164
(1973) (state individual income tax was unlawful as applied to reservation Navajo Indians
with respect to income derived wholly from reservation sources); Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). In Merrion, the Court stated:
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, we
addressed the Indian tribes' authority to impose taxes on non-Indians doing
business on the reservation. We held that “[t]he power to tax transactions
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arguments regarding governments and individuals. The argument is not
whether such rights exist53 but rather about the division of jurisdiction
between various sovereigns within Indian Country (i.e., can the tribe tax
non-Indians, can it regulate non-Indian activities, can it participate in
market activities in the manner of corporations). If we establish the right to
our indigenous institutions, we should be better able to assert a right to our
own economic paths.
Finally, in this vein, the reader must remember this discourse is not
primarily about what federal Indian law says, but where traditional tribal
law can be found, what that law might say, and how it might be fostered.
Personal conversations with one Meko best illustrate why this is so
imperative. The Meko related a discussion he had with another Meko, who
expressed that if the time comes when the Mvskoke language can no longer
be used in the ceremonies because the last speaker at his ground dies, it
may be time to put out the fireplace. Doing so would end that ceremonial
ground and all the distinct cultural jurisprudence attached thereto.
Statements such as these must be taken at face value as to how the
ceremonial people perceive fundamental directives of traditional law and
how it must be adhered to by the people. This comports precisely with the
saying of some of the Euchee old people “that if you want to dance you
have a place to dance,” meaning that stomp dances should be done only at
the ceremonial grounds.54 Clearly, this traditional law perspective is
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a
fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it
by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status.” The power
to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary
instrument of self-government and territorial management.
Id. at 137 (citations omitted).
53. See, for example, Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit from 1981 until 2017, a leading jurist of the modern era who built his
reputation upon economic analysis applied to dispute resolution. His jurisprudential
philosophy has been described as arguing “that judges should consciously use law to further
designate[] social goals, namely wealth maximization.” Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B.
Sander, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 562
(2008).
54. This phrase infers there is a place to do things and a way to do things. It goes to
sacred site issues as to which places may hold ceremonial dances, and nowhere else, and
what happens when those lands are threatened. It should also be noted that this conception of
the “only place to dance” is changing in recent years as more and more people, including
Euchee, begin to participate in “indoor” social stomp dances. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at
167, 170-73. None of the other stomp dance tribes appear to adhere to this strict prohibition
of dancing away from the ceremonial grounds. However, there are still some Mekvlke
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separate and apart from Indian law discussions about how Indian law is
derived from political status and that tying federal tribal rights to existing
culture risks losing those rights if/when the culture thins out too much. The
federal and state actors using the thinning argument that Indians are
becoming less “Indian” through reduced blood quantum, language loss,
“tenuous” cultural ties, and life apart from the reservation as a means to
attack our political sovereignty are diametrically different than us arguing
that our cultural sovereignty must be affirmatively recognized within our
right to political sovereignty.
I now turn to three issues. First, tribes, some more than others, retain
vestiges of our unique traditional societal structures that form a
jurisprudence and that may aid in rejuvenation of our societies. Second, the
American legal structures that deal with Indians as peoples are not purposed
to allow the vestiges to continue. Third, if they are to continue, or even to
some extent recover, a new legal system must be implemented that can
recognize and account for traditional societies. With this in mind,
domestication of the UNDRIP is the system most likely to succeed in
rejuvenation efforts.
III. A Ceremonial Approach to Law
Scholars have looked to the development of Indian law as "other"
through a review of Western thought.55 Additionally, scholars have shown
the flaws in current Supreme Court federal Indian case law.56 These authors
have exposed the inherent flaws with Indian law and what needs to change
before Native peoples can have true protections in federal law. Such
analysis does not inform what distinct jurisprudence exists within the tribal
society nor ferret out the foundations upon which we can strengthen or
rebuild our own structures. I realized over time that I approached Indian
law issues from my Euchee perspective, not federal law looking towards the
tribal. I pursued a complimentary but opposite endeavor from most by
attempting to understand tribal jurisprudence from knowledge of our
traditional society.

within the Muscogee Nation who strongly oppose dances away from the sacred fire. See text
accompanying infra note 177 (statement of Mekvlke Proctor and Thompson).
55. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., SAVAGE ANXIETIES (2012).
56. See WALTER ECHOHAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST
INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED (2010) [hereinafter ECHOHAWK, 10 WORST INDIAN LAW
CASES].
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I assumed my people still had elements within our society that were
sufficient to piece together at least parts of a traditional jurisprudence. The
question is what, from our perspective, binds together our members as a
still-existing traditional society? Further, where can these elements be
found? With a conscious understanding of our unique internal
jurisprudence, we can better determine what must be done to sustain our
society regardless of participation within the larger American culture. This
section sits within our arbors and looks at our own people for examples.
These examples indicate where we may draw guidance and discussions
about our beliefs as forming a jurisprudence ordering what continues to
exist of our Native society. It does not lay out a full jurisprudence but rather
illustrates bits of where it might be derived.
Tribes retain varying degrees of their original traditional culture, some
fairly intact, some perhaps mere remnants. However, to the extent the
culture remains as a jurisprudence, it should be protected and respected,
both internally and externally.57 Discourse on this topic seems to mostly
occur not in published works, but between a few tribal judges in the
hallways at meetings such as the National American Indian Court Judges
Association, Federal Bar Association Indian Law Section, or similar
gatherings. Former Navajo Supreme Court Justice Raymond Austin has
written on the dynamics facing this issue:
Making Indian common law a significant and daily part of
modern Indian life on reservations across the country will not
happen unless we educate Indian leaders, Indian peoples, and
eventually non-Indians. American Indians must understand the
intricacies of their own traditional ways and the powers inherent
in their philosophies, customs, and traditions in order to garner
benefits from them.58
Imbuing Indian institutions with traditional values, as Austin suggests,
requires that those institutions must either originate with or involve those
who understand traditional cultures. In Oklahoma and elsewhere, modern
tribal governments, for the most part, carry out their functions using
structures modeled on Western forms, such as the “Business Committee”
57. As to the external protections, a system of law claiming to have as its foundation
fairness and justice, such as the United States, should protect those indigenous institutions
that are most endangered and vulnerable. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2
(U.S. 1776) (stating that all men “are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”).
58. AUSTIN, supra note 12, at xxiii.
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and court systems59 created under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). 60
Felix Cohen and John Collier envisioned their legacy, the 1934 IRA, and
the IRA’s 1936 sibling, the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (OIWA),61 as
rejuvenating tribal governments after the federal policy of suppression from
the late 1800s to the 1930s.62 These pieces of legislation began the
alteration of many tribal governments away from traditional forms,
although that does not appear to have been the intent.63 Westernizing of
Native institutions continues even while American courts explore
alternative dispute resolution that consciously or coincidentally models
indigenous institutions such as peacemaker courts. However, to create tribal
institutions that utilize traditional systems, one must first determine whether
there is anything to sustain.
Presently in many tribal communities, it is often a matter of traditional
institutions trying to survive, rather than a question of sustainability. By
sustainability, I refer to a communal interaction, a shared knowledge within
the community, and commonality of purpose sufficient to achieve
continuity. Inherent in being sustainable is having sufficient numbers to
share the burden among community members. Survival, though, refers to
the fact that certain tribal institutions may disappear with the passing of but
59. This is a natural result of criteria the federal government increasingly requires of
tribes in order to expand their tribal institutions, such as found in Tribal Law and Order Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, § 234, 124 Stat. 2261, 2280 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
1302) (increasing criminal penalties in tribal courts from one year in jail and $5000 fine to a
maximum of three years in jail and $15,000 fine (with a maximum of nine total years’
incarceration)); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, tit. IX, Pub. L. No.
113-4, sec. 904, § 204, 127 Stat. 54, 120 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304) (allowing criminal
prosecution against non-Indians in tribal courts, discussed infra Part IV.A). See also 45
C.F.R. 1356.21(i) (providing timelines for termination of parental rights in foster placements
if the tribes are seeking foster care payments (noting, however, tribes’ ability to vary will
depend on specific tribes’ laws, statutes, or rules)).
60. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5129) (reclassified from 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479) (also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act).
61. Ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5209).
62. In a 1934 memorandum published posthumously in 2007, Felix Cohen wrote:
“Those Indians who have had experience in self-government will not need this guide. For
many years, however, most of the Indian tribes have not only been denied the right to
manage their own affairs, but have even been denied a voice in those affairs.” FELIX S.
COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS 3-4 (David E. Wilkins ed., 2007)
[hereinafter COHEN, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS].
63. The use of westernized institutions is not always the IRA’s fault. The Navajo use a
president and council system but have not adopted the IRA or written a constitution. See
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 12, at loc. 1271 (“Collier saw old values and customs
transformed, not replaced or transmuted.”).
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a few individuals. Native languages are a prime example of survival versus
sustainability. My mother’s Golaha (grandmother) Millie in the mid-1920s
to 1930s raised my mother, my mother’s four siblings, and several of their
cousins.64 Golaha Millie, unlike most Indians of that time, insisted the
children all speak Euchee upon their return home from Indian boarding
schools, regardless of them being punished for speaking it at school.65 My
mother told the following story of the day when she and her siblings came
back to Golaha’s home during a school break and were all playing in the
yard:
I guess we were all speaking in English because Golaha came
out and yelled at us in Euchee, saying: “Di tsolehe nonda nehdze
sawlawle Euchee-haw! Nedze saw-lawle Eucheehaw gowadine
o-gwa-guhn!!” (This is my house and you are all Euchee. When
you are here you speak Euchee!)
That is what they did at her house from then on. Because of this stubborn
streak, three of the last four or five native fluent speakers of Euchee were
Golaha Millie’s grandchildren.
The above story is a matter of survival of the language. If other Euchee
households had done the same then it might have created a sustainable
language environment.66 Euchee not only unites the tribe through
commonality of language, but the structure of our language may have
played a role in retaining an ongoing cohesion. In Euchee, pronouns
referring to other Euchee classify male or female and whether a man or
woman is speaking. However, reference to non-Euchee animate objects all
use the same pronoun “wanuh,” regardless of whether speaking of another
non-Euchee Indian or a non-Indian. It also is used to refer to any other
64. Why and how this happened is another long story that also has implications on
traditional Euchee society and jurisprudence as to responsibility to family, tribe, and culture.
65. Native language use was actively suppressed at federally sponsored boarding
schools, and usually local public and private schools as well, up to very recently. Professor
K. Tsianina Lomawaima quotes a student from the Chilocco Indian Agricultural School
(near Newkirk, Oklahoma) as saying, “[I]t was frowned on for any of the students to speak
their native tongue.” K. TSIANNA LOMAWAIMA, THEY CALLED IT PRAIRIE LIGHT: THE STORY
OF CHILOCCO INDIAN SCHOOL 139 (1994). Richard H. Pratt, the founder of Carlisle Indian
School in 1879, also wrote that “the sooner the Indian loses all his Indian ways, even his
language, the better it will be for him and the government.” Id. at 5.
66. The United Nations recognized the dire status of indigenous languages worldwide in
2016 when the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 71/178, proclaiming 2019 the
International Year of Indigenous Languages. G.A. Res. 71/178, Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, ¶ 13 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://undocs.org/A/RES/71/178.
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living thing (i.e., animals).67 Thus, in our language there are Euchees and
then there are all other living things.68
Of the few remaining native languages, many are near extinction. In
1491, over three hundred Native languages were spoken in North America.
One paper from 1996 estimated that in the United States, some 175
languages continued to exist, with perhaps twenty of those Native
languages being learned in the traditional manner of transmission from
elders to children.69 Currently, many have only a handful of speakers left
who are usually the elderly.70 These numbers have certainly decreased since
1996, despite ongoing efforts by some tribes. The Euchee language now has
two or three remaining Native, fluent speakers. Fortunately, the efforts of
several young people have created a few new Euchee speakers. However,
once a language descends to only a handful of fluent speakers, it takes
extraordinary concerted efforts to carry it forward.
Two points are illustrated by Golaha Millie and the status of languages.
First, in situations such as the Euchee, even if the language somehow
survives, the richness of the language is lost in that a mere handful of
speakers are unlikely to know all the nuanced complexity a language used
to have when expressed by a full, vibrant society. For example, if it were
primarily homemakers that retained the language (as was the situation with
Euchee), they would know in detail the language of the home. They would
also know about the farmers, hunters, warriors, politicians, healers, and so
forth. However, they would unlikely be as fluent in the full complexity of
those other dialogues, leading to loss of linguistic information and societal
explanations. Secondly, the reason that the Euchee language survived was
not because Golaha talked about the importance of the language, nor that
she worried about it, but rather because she insisted her grandchildren live
the language. Similarly, traditional society will continue to exist only if
sufficient people live it, as opposed to attend conferences to discuss the
nature of traditional societies.71
67. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 5, 49.
68. One wonders what nuanced worldview is lost when this is no longer used
consistently in all discussions.
69. Michael Krauss, Status of Native American Language Endangerment, in
STABILIZING INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE 15, 15-16 (Gina Cantoni ed., 1996).
70. The calculation of exact numbers of fluent speakers is subjective. Questions always
arise as to a person’s “true” fluency. Do they merely understand, speak, or speak really well?
Is their speech halting or smooth? Do they know all the proper forms, tenses, and
vocabulary? Nonetheless, the numbers of native language speakers are depressingly few
throughout Indian Country.
71. Or write long articles about it, I might add.
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This is an issue that has reality with the Euchee. We have three
ceremonial grounds, with Polecat being the main ground and the only one
that does the entire Green Corn day dance ceremony. Around 1960, Polecat
stopped dancing for about three years. Fortunately, Polecat started up again
but with only five or six families and maybe six or seven men sitting in the
arbors at the first reconvened Green Corn. Presently, on Green Corn day at
Polecat, there are over twenty camps open and filled by Euchee families,
with sometimes 500 to 750 or more people participating, visiting, and
observing. Not all present are Euchee. The three arbors on the square
ground will be completely full of menfolk while doing the day dances and
taking medicine for Green Corn.
Of interest here, however, is that those dances do not happen by accident.
Before all the Euchee families have their relations come back, many things
must occur. One never reads in books of the work done to get wood for the
ground’s fireplace, tuning chainsaws, sharpening axes, having to gather on
some Saturday morning to cut wood and then split and stack it. In the recent
past, these work parties sometimes had a mere six to ten men. This is but
one small example of work needed to be done. Similarly, our grounds have
many positions within it that need filling. Polecat has a main chief, three
assistant chiefs, four councilors, four feathermen, two-day dance singers,
and a ground’s speaker, to name a few positions. If that much work must be
done or that many positions must be filled, and if there are only a handful
consistently present, then the survivability of a traditional society becomes
more and more difficult. The large amount of knowledge which should be
spread among numerous people will inevitably see some loss. There is
simply too much to know and but a few to carry it all forward. This likely
happened during our low point at Polecat in the 1950s and 1960s.
Ultimately, a vibrant society needs people.
The tribal towns, the Muscogee counterparts of Polecat, were the
foundations of the Creek Confederacy that coalesced in the late 1700s to
form the Muscogee Nation. While the tribal towns originally were also of a
political nature, they now primarily continue only their religious and
spiritual functions.72 After surviving the Trail of Tears during removal from
Georgia and Alabama in the 1830s, some forty-four tribal towns re-kindled
their fireplaces in the Muscogee Nation’s new home in Indian Territory. 73
72. In the Mvskoke language, the same term, etvlwv, continues to be used to refer to
tribal towns in all their iterations and to tribes, in general.
73. Mekvlke Yargee, Proctor, and Thompson all noted that while forty-four towns
rekindled their fire places upon arrival in Indian Territory, other tribal towns simply folded
their fire back into their “mother” fire/ground or simply ceased to exist.
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Each town retained its own fireplace and ceremonies.74 There were likely
more towns and sub-towns prior to removal. Some were either not
rekindled or folded back into their mother grounds that arrived in Indian
Territory.
In recent times, the number of grounds continue to dwindle. Many of the
ceremonial towns that survived removal saw their dances cease and their
sacred fires extinguished, especially during the period between 1930 and
1970. Ceremonial grounds within the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
increasingly face the survival versus sustainable issue. World War II
accelerated the disruption to the traditional structures, not only due to men
leaving for military service, but also due to both men and women relocating
for jobs and educations during the war. This pattern continued after World
War II and the return of the Muscogee and Euchee soldiers. One example is
an elderly Euchee Chief that served in World War II. Upon his return from
overseas, he was approached by his uncles to learn the traditional medicines
to doctor Euchees. As he had a family and job, he deferred his training.
When he finally wished to learn the medicines and songs, his uncles were
no longer able to teach him. Thus, that part of Euchee society has ceased.
At present, there are between thirteen and fifteen active grounds within
the Muscogee Nation, three of which are Euchee. Just as with Polecat in the
early 1960s, several existing Muscogee grounds’ survivals are of concern as
they have not danced the last few years. When the grounds do not hold their
regular annual dances or taking of medicine, they may be considered
inactive. That can happen for a variety of reasons, including death of a
member, lack of someone with knowledge of how to prepare the necessary
medicines, or property disputes. Being inactive, though, is not the same as
the ground’s “fire having gone out.” By that phrase, it is inferred the town’s
fireplace is no longer alive, the medicines are gone, and dances can no
longer be held. As a ground disappears, the traditional norms and
relationships unique to that particular ground also disappear. Obviously, it
will no longer be sustainable as a society. After the tribal town ceases, those
people who formed that tribal town likely maintain their Muscogee identity
and may still identify as coming from a particular town. However, those
communal town relations will disappear. How those grounds uniquely view
relationships, history, values, and how those systems comprise a society,
are lost.
74. The forced removal story is all the more amazing in the untold tale of how the tribal
towns in the 1830s transported their embers, coals, ashes, or medicines from their
ceremonial fireplaces in Alabama and Georgia to their new homes in Indian Territory. Each
amazing effort depended on the requirements of the tribal town and the fire.
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Over the last dozen or so years, the Mekvlke and their assistants and
councilors of the remaining active Muscogee and Euchee ceremonial
grounds have met during the winter months to discuss the above issues and
other areas of common concern. Chief among those concerns is the need to
continue our way of life. In January of 2015, my grounds, the Polecat
Euchee Stomp Ground, hosted such a meeting near Kellyville, Oklahoma.
The meeting was attended not only by Euchee and Muscogee ceremonial
chiefs and councilors, but also several of our friends and relations75 from
the Shawnee and Cherokee grounds. With the three Euchee grounds, six
Muscogee grounds, plus Shawnee and Cherokee grounds, there were about
thirty ceremonial chiefs, councillors, and leaders in attendance. Each of the
grounds spoke to problems they face in carrying on their ceremonies. It
quickly became apparent the concerns of each ground were common to all
those in attendance.76 Each concern addressed what the Mekvlke considered
duties they had to their ceremonies and their members. The Mekvlke had
thought considerably about these issues, as the problems go to the heart of
who they are and their ability to survive as an active ceremonial people (or
society). They see a duty to carry on what had been given to them by their
elders, a way of life going back far before the time of removal in the 1830s.
A. Shawjwane (Rabbit) and Gojithla (Monster), a Jurisgenerative Tail
A long time ago, when the old people used to be here, they used to tell
this story.77 That was when all the animals still spoke Euchee. (They all
spoke Euchee because they were wise animals in those days.) The animals
were all gathered together to discuss a problem. It seems Gojithla had been
roaming about eating all the animals. So, they met in council to discuss how
75. “Relations” here is used in the traditional sense, which does not necessarily mean
any blood relations but instead a traditional relationship that infers obligation and reciprocity
that often is as deep as blood relations.
76. As discussed in more detail at supra Section III.A.
77. Di’ile in Euchee refers to stories or legends, usually about animals, that were
traditionally told to children at bedtime. See supra note 23. See also GUNTHER WAGNER,
YUCHI TALES passim (1931), https://archive.org/details/rosettaproject_yuc_vertxt-2. These
stories usually began with the Euchee phrase “gae-sthaw-la aw-ha-e-ha” and would usually
conclude with a similar phrase. This served as a marker that the story told was not originated
by the teller, was of ancient origin, and had authority as coming from “ones who have gone
on.” Thus, the introduction served as a traditional citational source. From personal
experience working with elders in the early 1990s, it appears not all families told them.
Perhaps this was due to breakdown in family structures, or perhaps some were just not story
tellers. However, these are of the type the elders might have also told or referred to among
themselves. It was also formerly customary that the teller spit on the ground after the telling.
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something had to be done. They each looked to see who might go forth and
take care of (kill) Gojithla. Da-thlah (Wolf) wasn't willing. Sage (Bear) just
hung his head and said nothing. Snake was worried he would be eaten.
Shawjwane (Rabbit), meanwhile, was flirting with the girl sitting next to
him.78 Shawjwane heard the girl say, “All those others are so scared, isn't
anyone brave enough to save us from that monster?” Shawjwane, wanting
to impress the girl, jumped up and said, “I'll do it! I'll do it if you just make
my lunch for the journey,79 I'll take care of Gojithla.” They were all so
excited that they patted him on the back and congratulated him. Shawjwane
felt very proud of himself. Bright and early the next morning, the animals
got up and fixed Rabbit’s lunch for the trip and gave it to him. He threw it
over his shoulder, and down the road he went.
As Shawjwane went down the path, he began to shake as he got more
and more scared thinking about what he got himself into. Gojithla was very
big and Shawjwane did not want to be eaten. He would rather be flirting
with the girls. Pretty soon, though, he saw Monster coming down the path
towards him. So, Rabbit yelled out, “Digawdi! Digawdi! (My friend! My
friend!) Dzogawla! Dzogawla! (My cousin! My cousin!) How are you?”
Gojithla looked at him and said, “Brother Rabbit, how are you today?”
Rabbit told Monster, “Good, good, nothing’s wrong. Sit, sit, let's visit a
while, I haven't seen you in a long time.” They then sat and visited. They
talked and pretty soon it was getting late and they were getting hungry.
They decided to eat their lunch. Rabbit opened his lunch and he had some
carrots, celery, and such. Monster opened his lunch and asked Rabbit if he
wanted to share, but Shawjwane saw a foot in there for Gojithla’s lunch.
When Rabbit saw that, he started getting a little sick and told him no, he did
not want any.
After they finished eating, they visited longer and soon it was getting
late. Rabbit said: “It’s almost dark, why don’t we dance a while?” Monster
said that would be good, so they started a fire. They were about to get
started when Rabbit asked Monster, “I am just curious my friend, we don’t
get to visit much, what's it take to hurt you? I bet there isn’t anything that
78. Mary Linn explained about Shawjwane that:
Among the Yuchi, Rabbit understands both nature and culture but regularly
seeks to subvert either or both. He is a great singer and dancer, but he is also a
ne’er-do-well who seeks to obtain wives, meals, and social prestige via clever
schemes that sometimes achieve their ends but also further Rabbit’s poor
reputation.
JACKSON, supra note 15, at 45.
79. Lunch or eating always appeared to be an important part of Rabbit’s concerns.
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can kill you, you're so big and strong.” Monster said, “Well you know if
you chop off my big toe that would be the end of me.” Monster looked at
Rabbit and asked him, “What about you?” Rabbit looked down, saw a little
bug going by, and said, “Well, if somebody were to smash this little bug it
would be all over for me.” Monster looked at Rabbit and stepped away.
They started dancing around the fire, having a good time. One would lead
and the other followed. Then the other would lead for a while and the other
would follow. After a while, Monster was really leading. He had his head
thrown back singing. Rabbit grabbed his hatchet, and next thing you know,
he chopped off that monster’s toe. Monster started to jump around
screaming and hollering. That scared Rabbit, and he ran off into the woods
shaking with fear. Finally, he didn't hear anything, so he came back. There
was Monster, dead. Rabbit took out his axe and chopped off Gojithla’s
head, put it in his bag, and went back to where all the other animals were.
When the animals saw Shawjwane they were all very excited. They had a
big dance, a big celebration, and Rabbit got to flirt with all the girls. That is
what they used to say when they were all here.
This Di’ile was one of many that Euchee parents and grandparents told
to children and each other. Now, however, it likely is not told much and
certainly not in the Euchee language. Besides being a story, it also tells us
some things about the Euchee. It says that although those animals were all
different, still they gathered together in council to deliberate and address
their common issues. It tells that when a person transgressed the norms of
society, others in the society could resolve to take action. Gojithela and
Shawjwane also show that not all tribal societies believed in restorative
justice. We, Euchee (and Creeks), believed in punishment and revenge that
could be decided upon by the whole.80
The concept of kinship is also illustrated in this story. Along his journey,
Rabbit greets Monster as his friend and relation, which in Euchee made the
old people laugh because Shawjwane calls Gojithla friend and relation
80. See, e.g., LAWS OF THE CREEK NATION Law 1st, at 17 (Antonio J. Waring ed., 1960)
(from a compiled set of Creek laws dated March 15, 1824) (“Murder shall be punished with
death the person who commits the act shall be the only one punish and only upon good
proofs.”). This appears to be a significant shift in Creek law, as blood retribution was the old
custom whereby if the Creek perpetrator fled, one of the perpetrator’s family or clan
relations would be substituted for punishment. This punishment streak remained through the
closing years of the nineteenth century and final days of the Muscogee Courts’ first
incarnation with the jury trial and sentence of death for Timmie Jack in 1896. Id. at 17 n.1;
see A Trial and Execution Among the Creeks, 12 CHRONS. OKLA. 142, 142-44 (1934),
https://cdm17279.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p17279coll4/id/4225/rec/51.
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(whom Rabbit is sent to kill). That Rabbit so lightly throws these terms
about shows part of Rabbit’s nature. The old women who retold this tale
always laughed hardest at this part because it was so incongruous for Rabbit
to be claiming Monster as his cousin even as he plotted to kill him. Kinship
is an important concept within tribal society with great meaning and weight.
These two words seem to be related in Euchee. “Dzogawlaw” is “my
relation” (or infers the English equivalent of “my cousin”), and the other is
“Digawdi” for “my friend.” They appear to have the same root, being tied
together somehow. In Euchee, friends and relations are connected in that
they require duties to others. So this little Di’ila, what some might call a
children’s story, shows that society addresses problems through council
meetings, what is expected of its males, the results of transgressions against
society, the nature of punishment, and what the concept of friends and
relations demands.81 Because this one simple story derives from and is
imbued with the nature of Euchee society, there are many things which we
can learn from it about how Euchee people are supposed to act.
This narrative form is also seen in our ceremonial life. An outsider
watching our stomp dances or our main Green Corn day dances at Polecat
might see some of the beauty we feel, but it would likely not appear overly
complicated to them. However, almost everything done has a story that
explains what, why, or how it came to us, though some of those stories are
no longer known. These stories, more so than Shawjwane, can define the
relationship between the living and the deceased, duties to others, and why
certain plants are used for which purposes. While I will not go into those
stories, one example is of the Lizard Dance with its explanation of
doctoring, use of cedar, and other Euchee beliefs.82
Within our ceremonial grounds, stories are used to explain each part of
our grounds, attendant ceremonies, dances, and the requirements we must
adhere to therein. When one begins to go through all the stories, the dances
begin to take on a depth that cannot be comprehended from a casual
observation. We know there was at one time explanations for all of our
ceremonies. Unfortunately, there are many stories or explanations that we
no longer know regarding the things we still carry on. These ceremonial
roles and stories often explain our life and proper conduct, telling us who
we are. As such, they are foundational principals of our traditional
jurisprudence. If they make a coherent whole, so be it. Regardless, these
stories and explanations continue to comprise what we believe and use to
81. And, of course, it shows that you should really never trust Rabbit.
82. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 180-94.
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order our society. In so doing, for Indian advocates with a traditional
perspective, this accomplishes two functions. First, it instructs as to the
potential nature of our society. Secondly, it may illustrate impediments such
as loss of stories, language, and sustainability to the survival of traditional
societies. Thus, after we raise this knowledge to consciously comprising
part of a jurisprudence, we can then explore problems facing the continuity
of those beliefs as a living system.
These stories illustrate another aspect of traditional society that I
unknowingly understood as important to true efforts to strengthen this
traditional society. Among the Euchee and the Muscogee, the use of long
form narration seems to be a common theme in traditional explanation of
meanings. As noted, for Euchee ceremonies, each dance, function, or
meaning is explained with a story that teaches what we do. In my
experience, when business is discussed in traditional meetings, again
extended narration occurs, usually without interruption until each
participant has spoken. The Mekvlke meetings tend to take this form of
each speaking to conclusion without interruption or questions, and then,
after all have in their turn spoken, discussion will occur.83 If we are to find a
way to continue the substance of traditional society and respect that society,
the processes of that society should, if not utilized, at least be recognized.
The process by which one achieves a goal is often as important as the goal
and can shape the goal itself. This obvious process seems less used than it
should if any anecdotal attendance of legal forums on sacred sites is an
indicator.
In exploring where and how to find traditional normative indicators,
lessons learned from Shawjwane may in fact be illustrative of how we must
begin to proceed. This may well be a jurisgenerative moment as articulated
by Kristen Carpenter and Angela Riley for the potential to create new
substantive law through use of the UNDRIP.84 Carpenter and Riley
forcefully argue that this is the moment to 1) bring indigenous norms and
values to the international level; but also, 2) bring reform to tribal
governments by inserting human rights into the tribes.85
My perspective, as tempered by the above examples, is slightly different
but is perhaps simply the internal corollary that before Indigenous
advocates can bring Indigenous norms to anyone else, we must act to
rediscover or recover the traditional norms and discoursive structures we
83. See also discussion supra Section III.B.
84. Kristen Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative
Moment in Human Rights, 102 CAL. L. REV. 173, 175 (2014).
85. Id.
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may still have but are not utilizing. For many tribes, this moment is on the
verge of slipping away (as noted in the discussion of sustainability). What
must occur in much of Indian Country, immediately before the moment
passes, is to have a traditional renaissance—a rebirth of those best parts of
our culture. This is a moment to create or recover processes which generate
law with traditional forms learned from the subjects of our advocacy.86 It is
not enough to require the international community to recognize our rights
without accepting our responsibility to our own societies. The use of long
form narration to explore traditional jurisprudence, as done with the Rabbit
diele, respects both the substance and processes of Indigenous society. This
needs to be a jurisgenerative moment that inserts indigenous norms into the
federal and international level, but also a resurrection of traditional
indigenous values and processes—87 a juris-regenerative moment for tribal
institutions.
B. Ceremonial Grounds as Law
In the spring of each year, Polecat Euchee Ground begins its annual
ceremonial cycle that ultimately leads to the new year ceremonies in July,
commonly referred to as Green Corn. The other two Euchee grounds
likewise begin their cycle around the same time, as do the remaining
Muscogee grounds. Polecat begins its season at Easter with its members
gathering at the square grounds to play the first of four Indian football
games.88 A few years back at one of these early games, the then-Chief of
86. This realization has allowed me to understand Meko Yargee’s explanation of how
speakers at the ceremonial ground practice regarding the speeches they must make: “You
should look at a tree, pick a branch and begin talking, following that branch till it reaches the
next branch, then speak about the next thing which must be said. You continue like this from
branch to branch till you have said all that you need to say.” Personal conversation with
Meko Yargee. I began to understand that what he meant might be described as a traditional
methodology of explanation. I also realized I was trying to use this process herein, using
stories to illustrate why the UNDRIP needs to be developed within tribal law and pushed
into federal law.
87. This is happening to some extent in the resurgence of peacemaking models in court
systems. Many tribal courts utilize peacemaking as an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism that seeks to restore harmony with the tribal community based on traditional
norms (for the most part). It turns out non-Indian state courts are interested in this process,
too.
88. Indian football is an old traditional game the Polecat Grounds has played for as long
as anyone knows. It is not related to American football or soccer. While I will generally not
go into details of how our ceremonies or traditional activities are conducted, doubtlessly, it is
easily found out about through other sources. Indian football is an activity greatly looked
forward to by Polecat Ground members.
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Polecat Grounds spoke to the members in order to address several issues.89
He was in his late-sixties at the time and spoke of how he grew up at the
grounds, of all the old people there during that time, and of the difficulties
they encountered in keeping our ceremonial life going. He discussed the
roles a person might hold at our grounds and what it took to perform such
function. He spoke of the women’s dances and the role they had in our
ceremonies. He discussed the chiefs’ and committee members’ duties and
the respect that must be given to them. He covered the way in which boys
and girls were to be educated and how they were to grow up in the grounds.
He also touched upon how we were to conduct ourselves in each of the
families’ camps around the square ground. He did not go into depth about
each of these duties but was simply speaking of our duties within the
grounds. That moment led to a revelation resulting in this Article: that, for
the Euchee, religion and society at one time were one. The Chief was
unknowingly explaining how our society had been structured. The Chief
was discussing how young people were to be trained and educated, how
people were to treat each other, what was to be done when a dispute arose,
and what we needed to do to continue as a people. These could be
understood as obligation and duty to family, tribe, and the square ground. In
briefly explaining the history of our grounds, he was laying out the rules of
how traditional Euchee civil society had operated. Explaining how one’s
society orders itself and what rules apply is at the core of jurisprudence. It
explains the laws of a society. Thus, learning about traditional Euchee
ceremonial grounds means learning about elements necessary to lay out a
traditional Euchee jurisprudence.
The ceremonial grounds had divisions between the chiefs’ and warriors’
arbors, with each playing their role in decision-making and conduct of the
square ground’s business. Each of these roles had both a procedural and
spiritual aspect. Those spiritual and physical functions are tied together but
can be understood as derived from the towns’ historical conduct of tribal
business. As described above, each tribal town had its chiefs’ and warriors’
arbors. Each arbor and its members therein had specific roles within the
town. Some were deliberative, some were decisionmakers, while others
were law-enforcers. The Euchee and Muscogee tribal towns had laws
governing conduct long before joining into confederation and had laws of

89. Interestingly, the traditional form of a chief speaking to his members is by using his
speaker to tell what he wishes to be communicated. However, as with all things, the usual
process is not always the process.
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nationwide effect for the confederacy written down as early as 1817.90 The
chiefs and headmen would meet in council and would, when necessary, act
as an adjudicative body, even prescribing the death sentence.91 For
example, in 1825, Chief William McIntosh violated the confederacy law
against signing treaties without the National Council’s approval and
received a death sentence from the body.92 With that knowledge, one can
look at the Muscogee Nation’s 1867 Constitution in a different light from
that commonly described in American history. The Muscogee Nation is
often referred to as one of the Five Civilized Tribes, a term used because
they appeared to readily adopt Western systems, including a tripartite
governmental system.93 The 1867 constitution created a two-part legislative
branch composed of a House of Warriors and a House of Kings (article I),
an executive branch headed by a principal chief (article II), and a judiciary
(articles III and V). However, the 1867 process looks similar to that which
the Muscogee and Euchee historically had in the tribal town, despite
outsiders not having realized this fact.94

90. See LAWS OF THE CREEK NATION, supra note 80, at 17-27 (alternately titled “Laws
of the Muscogee Nation” in this source); see also McIntosh v. Beaver, 6 Okla. Trib. 158,
161 n.2 (Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Ct. 1999), 1999 WL 33589146, at *1 n.2 (referencing
William McIntosh, Coweta mekko, and treaties done outside of tribal authority).
91. See LAWS OF THE CREEK NATION, supra note 80, at 10 (editor’s introduction).
92. Id. It should be noted that separation of powers was not always an English rule, as
the King’s Courts were, as the name implies, the king’s agencies, and not an independent
branch:
The Court of the King Before the King Himself[] was an English court of
common law in the English legal system. Created in the late 12th to early 13th
century from the curia regis, initially following the monarch on his travels, the
King's Bench finally joined the Court of Common Pleas and Exchequer of
Pleas in Westminster Hall in 1318, making its last travels in 1421.
Court of King’s Bench (England), WIKIPEDIA, https://web.archive.org/web/201811012353
40/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Court_of_King%27s_Bench_(England) (last visited Nov. 1,
2018).
93. ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES 5 (rev. ed. 1972) (1940).
94. See COHEN, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 62, at 32 (“A two-chambered
legislature was adopted by four of the Five Civilized Tribes, that is . . . the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation with a House of Kings and a House of Warriors . . . . In each case this plan
was adopted because of admiration for the United States Constitution rather than because of
any consideration of the special needs of the Indians concerned.”). There is remarkably little
about the internal political or religious structures from early European-tribal interactive
period. Most commentators looked only at external relations, or the internal political
disputes, without discussing the internal structures or comprehending the corollary spiritual
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Harmony within the tribal town was a sought-after goal as shown by the
four guiding principles of Alabama grounds: Ekvncvpecetv (humble),
Enhonretv (vkvsvmkv) (faith), Eyasketv (happy), and Vnokeckv (love). As
Meko Yargee explains, you must have the first three in order to have the
last one. He reminds his members to keep this in their minds as they go
about their duties that they must have love for each other.95
Another story from a Muscogee grounds is perhaps illustrative of how
Shawjwane’s mission is also in line with Euchee or Muscogee traditional
justice. Although “restorative justice” is common in much of Indian
Country, as exemplified by peacemaking courts, such efforts must be tribalspecific and not generically done. For instance, during a dance in the 1990s
at one Muscogee ground, a member showed up drunk, which was not
allowed. He was directed to leave but did not. One of the male warriors had
been given the task of enforcing the Meko’s orders, illustrated by his
carrying a traditional ball stick made out of hickory wood. These sticks are
the ones used in the traditional ball game96 and are quite effective weapons.
This warrior was directed to remove the drunk. When the drunk again
would not comply, the warrior hit the drunk on the head with his ball stick,
knocking the individual unconscious. The warrior at first worried he had
seriously injured the person, but he turned out to be fine. The warrior’s
father, a respected traditional leader at another ground, had long before this
incident told the warrior not to worry about such incidents as “there is no
arguing with a drunk.” At the time of the incident, another elder told the
warrior not to worry, repeating what the warrior’s father said. When the
drunk later tried to get the Muscogee Nation to bring assault charges, the
Nation declined, as “it was a grounds issues and the Meko handled it.”97
Another example of the nature of duty and perspective and how stories
may impose requirements comes from Polecat’s Over-the-Hill Dance. This
dance is only done at the Polecat Euchee grounds; neither of the other two
roles specific to Muscogee institutions. They seemed to be unaware of the religious
functions within the tribal towns.
95. This comes from conversations with Meko Bobby Yargee of Alabama Grounds.
Perhaps other grounds had different rules, or no such rules. However, it is illustrative of the
specific contextual morals that will be lost if tribal towns continue to disappear.
96. Often called in English “the little brother of war,” these games among the Muscogee
are ceremonial, social, and are tied to the grounds. One variant of this game used to settle
disputes between tribal towns and could be quite violent, resulting in serious injury or death.
My understanding is that sometime around the 1950s, the Mekvlke decided to put this
version away as it was no longer needed. The other version is still played and still can result
in injury.
97. This story was told to the author by a Muscogee warrior.
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Euchee grounds or any of the Muscogee grounds perform this dance. There
are Euchee stories about how this particular dance came about, but one
requirement of the dance is that it be done at straight up noon as the sun is
directly overhead. Our old stories tell that the Euchee are descended from
the sun, and thus, the old Euchees believed the sun would look down every
year to see if the dance was still happening. If the sun did not see the dance,
it meant there were no longer any Euchee and the sun would cry, set back in
the east, and the world would end. Thus, Polecat danced not just for us, but
for all others in order to carry on our people and the world.
Among the Euchee who still maintain these dances, there is often
discussion of what it means if we no longer have either our language or our
ceremonial dances. While most of us may no longer believe the world
would literally end if neither continue, in a cultural sense the world would
end for the ceremonial Euchee. For those old people, there might continue
to be people of Euchee descent but there would not be Euchee.98 Thus, the
Over-the-Hill Dance shows how obligations were, and continue to be,
imposed on the Euchee for the world around us and carried out through our
ceremonial functions. This is perhaps the perfect exemplar of Vine Deloria,
Jr.’s quote that “[t]here is no salvation in tribal religions apart from the
continuance of the tribe itself.”99 This obligation is not only to the Creator,
but also to other Euchee. It is integral to continuing Euchee society. It
exemplifies both a world view and societal obligation.
One Green Corn, many years ago now, my elderly aunt was helping my
wife at our camp. Perhaps she was shucking corn, or maybe mixing flour
for the fry bread. Regardless, one of our relations that only occasionally
participated came with his non-Euchee wife. She introduced herself to my
aunt and immediately proceeded to ask her what she thought about one of
the broad national Indian questions, whether it concerned Indian prisoners,
treaty rights, or some other such pan-Indian cause of the moment. My aunt
replied, “Oh my! . . .” and nothing more.100 There were certainly those of us
dancing that day involved in that or similar issues, and my aunt was
98. This perspective would seem to validate the concerns of Sam Deloria regarding
political extinction if culture disappears, discussed in Sam Deloria, supra note 45, at 313-14.
However, a significant difference is that the Euchee belief comes from the Indians, not an
outside party.
99. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED 194 (1994).
100. Her reply, and similarly my mother’s, always meant to us she heard and understood
the question or comment and had definite thoughts, but she was not about to voice them.
This was at least until later when we were not around anyone else, or perhaps only later
when she was around another Euchee elder and they could talk in Euchee.
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probably aware of such issues. However, she was a full-blood Euchee
woman, born, raised, and still speaking Euchee. She was doing things that
day which we had done for thousands of years. Our camp was full of
women preparing for the evening. Children were doing whatever they do,
and the men were on the square grounds attending to the medicine. Each
person had their place and function, which they happily fulfilled. Every
function needed to be done so that others could do theirs. This was the
understanding we had since long before removal in the 1830s. We all knew
this was a special place, and we all know it was a gift that would not sustain
itself. Thus, the question asked was simply not relevant at that time as to
whether we, Euchees, would continue. We were not looking to the outside.
We were focusing upon that which we were given to do.101 Those are two
very different perspectives that simply cannot be adequately expressed in
words or writing without seeing it in action. Thus, our existence flows from
our continuing to exist as Euchees. To be blunt, just as with Chitto Harjo’s
movement, once our “ancient ways” cease, mere political existence is
irrelevant to those who are of that traditional life.
Given all the above, it is also true Indians live broadly within the
mainstream society. That may be truer in some locations than in others. In
Oklahoma, with its checkerboarded Indian Country,102 many tribes lack a
minimum blood quantum for citizenship. Due to socio-economic changes,
such as the high number of intertribal and non-Indian marriages, when
tribal-ness comes out is not easily predetermined. As an example, I may be
watching television or doing work researching laws and statutes, and one of
my chiefs will call or stop by to talk. Our talk may cover ceremonial related
matters, veer off to football or family, and then come back to how we
understand the meaning of certain of our doings.103 This explanation of how

101. This is an issue with having our young people travel to support other tribal issues.
We need activists and need to recognize that attacks upon another tribe’s rights impact our
ability to resist transgressions against our own concerns. However, a problem exists when
those members support exterior traditional causes but then fail to attend our own ceremonies.
While raising awareness of indigenous rights in a broad context, it is all too easy to see one’s
own tribal ceremonies slip away from lack of participation.
102. Checkerboarding refers to the cut-up jurisdiction created by the allotment of the
tribal domains in the late 1800s and subsequent sale, or theft, of the Indians’ allotments into
non-Indian hands. This resulted in mixed Indian/state jurisdiction within an area of land that
resembles a checkerboard.
103. At present, Euchee and Muscogee stomp dance society exists most fully on
weekends throughout Muscogee territory. Participants return to their regular lives during the
week, mostly unbeknownst to our non-Indian neighbors and often to other Indians.
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members of traditional Euchee society interact illustrates a pattern of
continuance for a society that requires cross-cultural competence.
The earlier example of the work detail to gather wood for our dances,
and to a lesser degree, the example of my chief stopping over, show that
when we gather, we have the ability to visit and talk about the grounds and
our ceremonial ways. During our dances, each of us has responsibilities that
we must focus upon, which ironically means we may not be able to discuss
the stories and meanings of what we are doing. To the extent ground
members participate in all aspects of our traditional society, they will more
fully comprehend what we have as Euchee. They hear more stories, see
more of what it takes to carry on our ceremonies, and comprehend how it
all fits together to create a Euchee way of life. While we now tend to
discuss these as “helping out” with grounds’ work, they actually flow from
obligations owed to each other and the grounds itself to carry on that which
we were given. My aunt’s reaction to the question posed to her at Green
Corn is illustrative of this imperative obligation. As such, it seems it could
be used to understand jurisprudential obligations and duties to others and
the tribe.
The free flow across cultures is part of our life, as it should also be in our
court system.104 The tribal courts in which I work do not usually differ
much from the processes used in state and federal courts.105 The actual
differences can vary depending on the tribe and the issue. At the Kickapoo
Tribe of Oklahoma, arraignments and hearings are regularly done in
Kickapoo because of lack of English fluency. The procedural codes 106
mimic federal rules, but many criminal hearings are often more attuned to
the close traditional structure of the Kickapoo through less formality. The
court, though, is keenly aware to protect the parties’ rights and perhaps
spends more time on personalized understanding. Another more generic
example is that if one wants to conduct business in Indian Country, there

104. And in our tribal legislative efforts, too. Each of these arguments herein would seem
to be equally valid for the legislative and executive branches. However, I am a lawyer and a
judge, so that is the perspective I am trying to develop.
105. I had originally used the term “whiteman’s court.” That is how most Natives refer to
state and federal courts. It is a fairly accurate, if racially defined, term in that those courts are
predominately run by white males and dominated by mainstream cultural values derived
from European and Anglo-American backgrounds. That is not to say the state and federal
courts are inherently unfair, but rather merely an accurate observation of the cultural origin.
106. See KICKAPOO TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (n.d.), http://www.
kickapootribeofoklahoma.com/forms/criminalprocedures.pdf.
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are only so many ways to write and interpret business contracts.107 The
same is generally true for child support issues or simple divorces.108 But,
the percentage of cases that are different separates tribes from having a
native court and in form being little more than an Indian-run state court.
Where that difference occurs cannot always be easily written into law, nor
can it be predetermined when or how it will occur.109
If the court’s jurisprudential sources (i.e., the judges) do not have people
with traditional foundations or who live within the ceremonial cycle, no
amount of codification can reflect how certain processes should be
interpreted to infect them with traditional tribal values (i.e., the tribe’s
107. There is a Model Tribal Secured Transactions Code that is similar to those used in
the states, thus the term “model”. See MODEL TRIBAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS ACT (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2017), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/Download
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=45988e34-537b-57d7-6360-2e55ae44863e&force
Dialog=0. Often the issues really are an uncritical adoption of foreign law. As Winona
Single notes, too often adoption of laws, such as a model tribal commercial code, will within
it refer to other tribal laws that were not adopted or were also blanket adopted without
tailoring to the tribal specific situation. Wenona T. Singel, Cultural Sovereignty and
Transplanted Law: Tensions in Indigenous Self-Rule, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357, 361
(2006). This occurs in more ways than just adoption of “foreign” or western law, as the
author has reviewed codes from tribes which were adopted from another tribe that did not
delete or change the name of the original tribe. KICKAPOO TRIBE IN KANSAS TRIBAL CODE tit.
6, § 5(e) (1990) (Civil Procedure), https://www.ktik-nsn.gov/site/assets/files/1155/
tribal_code_title_6_civil_pro.pdf (“‘Tribal Legislative Body’ means the Business Committee
of the Sac and Fox Nation . . . .”). This, however, is often the result of tribes simply not
having the resources to review, develop, and amend codes and other regulations. The states
and federal government, despite budget woes, have staffs devoted to such matters. Such is
rarely the case in tribal settings, with the exception of the very largest or most successful of
tribes.
108. I am well aware that often there are distinctive indigenous characteristics of
personal relationships that can dictate a more tribal process in tribal courts. See Paul
Spruhan, The Meaning of Due Process in the Navajo Nation, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT AT FORTY, supra note 31, at 119, 123 (noting that the Navajo exerted personal
jurisdiction over a Utah official for intercepting Navajo welfare benefits because the Utah
official “interfered with the domestic relations of Navajos, a subject with strong cultural
ties” (citation omitted)). However, it is also true that in many instances, relationships
between people are not all that different across both tribal and mainstream cultures. These
should neither be under nor over played. Regardless, it should be for the tribe to determine
what, if any, differences exist.
109. Richland’s discourse on Hopi tribal court proceedings, see RICHLAND, supra note
12, shows how easily and unexpectedly Hopi internal jurisprudential pathways may arise in
court proceedings. The means and success with which those are blended into a process
nominally patterned on Anglo-American forms depends much upon whom is conducting the
hearings.
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common law). Paul Spruhan discussed how the Navajo Nation and the
Navajo courts in particular developed definitions of due process based upon
Navajo societal traditions of fairness.110 He interprets the Navajo courts as
“looking to the good of the community as well as the individual.”111 Just as
the Navajo courts look to their society, within our context herein,
ceremonial people understand process because traditional law requires
proper ways of doing things. Our ceremonies or work must start at sun up.
A dance must go over the hill at straight-up noon. Some ceremonies are
done in eight days and others by dusk. These are things that must be done
and be done in a certain manner. They must proceed from A, to B, to C, and
then D. If these things are not done properly, then the ceremonies must
cease, and the end has come.
There are processes which order both the spiritual world and our civil
society. These processes go to the manner in which disputes were resolved.
In Anglo-American proceedings, when a personal conflict of interest arises,
decisionmakers must step back. In contrast, at the Euchee grounds, the chief
had “no choice” but to decide a dispute, even if it involved his own family.
For our chief, the ground comes before all else, even family. In discussions
with several Muscogee Mekvlke, I found they also believe similarly.
Traditional society may not use the terminology of due process but
nonetheless understands the necessity of having to use proper procedure to
achieve results. This is the essence of due process. It is the task of Indian
lawyers to know and explain how traditional concepts form due process.
Fortunately, the modern Muscogee (Creek) Nation courts, even while
using a system generally based upon Anglo-American forms, have
continued to uphold Muscogee processes and institutions that predate the
United States. The Muscogee variations from American procedures are still
imbued with the purpose of achieving justice and granting due process,
albeit from a different cultural context. In Beaver v. Okmulgee Indian
Community,112 the Muscogee Supreme Court wrote:
Traditionally, when a dispute exists between Muscogee citizens,
the mekko and the tvstvnvke of the citizens’ tribal towns meet,
and give everyone involved a full opportunity to present all of
their arguments, in a civil manner. This tradition was recorded
long before Removal when General James Oglethorpe of

110. Spruhan, supra note 108, at 119-30.
111. Id. at 127.
112. 4 Mvskoke L. Rep. 183 (Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Ct. 1999) (No. SC–99–03).
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Georgia observed that Creek leaders, when discussing disputed
issues, gave everyone the “liberty to give their opinions.”113
The Court then went on to explain how these traditional values should be
carried forward into modern Muscogee Court proceedings:
While many aspects of the Anglo system of adversarial
jurisprudence are used by the Muscogee (Creek) Nation courts
today, this Court supports the tradition that tribal courts should
let litigants present their opinions, as freely as possible,
consistent with fairness and civility. Of course there must be
timeframes established for responsive pleadings. But should
there be differences of opinion regarding Court Rules, fairness to
all parties requires that they be able to at least present their
arguments to the Court. Rule 1 of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal
Rules for the Cherokee Nation says that its rules “shall be
liberally construed”. This court believes this concept is sound
because the purpose of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Courts is to
decide conflicts on the basis of fairness to all litigants.114
The Muscogee court’s substantive decision is in conformity with the
process discussed earlier that the Mekvlke use in their meetings.115 This
decision reflects the impact of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation having over
the last twenty-five years consciously appointed members of the ceremonial
grounds to the Nation’s supreme court. The right to use these Muscogee
forms is recognized throughout the UNDRIP,116 and needs to be recognized
as a federal right instead of a courtesy. This procedure should be
considered for use by tribal advocates when they discuss development of
traditional tribal rights.
The Muscogee Nation is not only a leading casino developer utilizing
modern technology, but as discussed here, has a vibrant traditional society
represented by the ceremonial grounds and their Mekvlke. Both are part of
our identity and neither can occur without active support in the challenges
they face. We tend to speak of traditional matters and courtroom matters as
if they are separate concerns, but it is all a continuum. Thus, even though
tribal court matters may be similar to Anglo courts, just as we switch
between football and ceremonies in personal conversations, the court, by
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
See supra text accompanying note 83.
See UNDRIP, supra note 4, arts. 5, 14, 18-20.
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having traditional awareness, can flow to or from traditional jurisprudence
as it did in Beaver.117 This is no different than in federal or state courts. To
read today's United States Supreme Court opinions is to interpret the
Federalist Papers written 225 years ago.118 The Federalist Papers are still a
valid part of American jurisprudence, despite their age. So it should be with
our tribe(s): to know who we are today and where we need to go, we must
be fluent in our origins and how those manifest themselves in the present. If
we are to argue for a right under international human rights, as previously
discussed, then we have a corresponding duty to know and give life to the
tribal processes we demand others recognize.
As another example, the Muscogee and Euchee recognize their veterans
of the armed services. Indian tribes have always had veterans, they were
just called warriors in history books. In our culture, the Euchee and
Muscogee warriors have a specific place under our arbors and duties within
our tribal towns. There is not a difference between how veterans and
warriors had a duty to serve their people. My mother, who was ninety-five
when she passed away in 2016, had three brothers, a brother-in-law, an
uncle, and cousins. They were all veterans of the armed services, many who
saw combat, some of whom were wounded. While not all of our old Indian
relations who were veterans served in the U.S. Armed Forces, they all
fought and died for this land nonetheless. My mother sometimes spoke of
her grandfather, Jimmi Wildcat, a full blood Euchee, who rode with Chitto
Harjo. My mother was told that while riding with Chitto Harjo, Grandpa
Jimmi somehow died (or was killed). She was told that in order for the
soldiers to not know the numbers of men that Chitto Harjo still had,
Grandpa Jimmi was buried under a cabin in the hills. As she was proud of
her brothers' and cousins' service for this country, she was also very proud
of her grandfather's sacrifice.
These Euchee and Muscogee warriors and chiefs understood the threat to
their way of life, what should be the nature of the relationship to the United
States, and articulated the problem and fought for their beliefs. In 1906, a
Special Senate Investigating Committee held public hearings in Tulsa on
117. 4 Mvskoke L. Rep. 183.
118. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 92 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Hamilton offered his view [in Federalist No. 81] that the federal judicial power would not
extend to suits against unconsenting States only in the context of his contention that no
contract with a State could be enforceable against the State's desire.”); Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 275 (1985) (“The Federalist Papers were written to
influence the ratification debate in New York.”); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806-09, 839 (1995).
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the conditions resulting from allotment of the Five Tribes.119 Harjo testified
to the Committee:
[The federal agent said] ‘I will protect you in all things and take
care of everything about your existence so you will live in this
land that is yours and your fathers' without fear.' That is what he
said and we agreed upon those terms . . . . He said as long as the
sun rises it shall last; as long as the waters run it shall last; as
long as the grass grows it shall last. That was what it was to be
and we agreed upon those terms . . . . I think there is nothing that
has been done by the people should abrogate them. We have
kept every term of that agreement. The grass is growing, the
waters run, the sun shines, the light is with us and the agreement
is with us yet for the God that is above us all witnessed that
agreement . . . .
Now, coming down to 1832 and referring to the agreements
between the Creek people and the Government of the United
States. What has occurred since 1832 until today? . . . I could
live in peace with all else, but they wanted my country and I was
in trouble defending it. It was no use. They were bound to take
my country away from me. It may have been that my country
had to, be taken away from me, but it was not justice. I have
always been asking for justice. I have never asked for anything
else but justice. I never had justice. First, it was this and then it
was something else that was taken away from me and my
people, so we couldn't stay there any more . . . . What was to be
done was all set out yonder in the light and all men knew what
the law and the agreement was. It was a treaty—a solemn
treaty—but what difference did that make? I want to say this to
you today, because I don't want these ancient agreements
between the Indian and the white man violated . . . .120
Chitto Harjo understood his treaties and explained them in a way that was
meant to protect his tribal society.121 Even assuming the variance in
119. John Bartlett Meserve, The Plea of Crazy Snake (Chitto Harjo), 11 CHRONS. OKLA.
899, 900-04 (1933), https://cdm17279.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p17279coll4/
id/2971/rec/50.
120. Id. at 902-04 (emphasis added).
121. Chitto Harjo continued his armed battle against the allotment process until 1911,
when a meeting was called at Harjo’s home. Harjo had directed Charlie Coker not to use
violence at that point. Somehow, the U.S. Marshals appeared at the meeting and shot Harjo.
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translation from Mvskoke to English, Chitto Harjo frames his arguments on
the basis of justice and treaties. These legal arguments are as valid today as
when made. The question is this: have we finally come to a time that others
can understand Chitto Harjo’s positions as he explained them, and do we
now have a mechanism(s) that can begin to assure compliance therewith?
These stories, each of a different nature, including the depopulation
hinted at in the Di’ila about “How Wolves Came to Be,”122 show possible
insights into the past and where knowledge of stories, traditional and
modern, might be found. When these stories and others from Euchee (or
Muscogee) history and culture are understood, one can begin to piece
together a Euchee (or Muscogee) jurisprudence. These may seem to be
mere ethnographic information, but they actually explain something of how
we view obligations and to whom they are owed and by whom they are
owed, as well as societal duties, the nature of family, continuity and
commitment, and how traditional law may conceptualize a different basis
for law. If one listens to the above stories with a critical ear that has some
traditional knowledge filters, one might begin to understand how modern
native society, with elements of traditional jurisprudence, can still be
structured.123
IV. Federal Indian Law
We have seen where traditional law might be found and a few examples
of what that law might show about the nature of relationships and
obligations within indigenous society. We next turn to the impediments to
traditional jurisprudence’s resurrection, continuance, or implementation for
Indian communities within the dominant American legal system. Scholars
have done exceptional work in showing how federal Indian law was shaped
by racism124 and/or is inherently centered upon a nationalistic perspective

Coker then considered his restriction ended and returned fire, wounding several Marshals.
Coker fled with the wounded Harjo across the Arkansas River. Harjo was reported by most
sources as having fled to Choctaw Country and died in 1911. However, Phillip Deere had in
his home a large picture of Harjo that he claimed was from circa 1917. This information
comes from conversations with Phillip Deere.
122. See supra note 23.
123. I purposely use “listen” and “ear” because while written, here the information’s
validity stands in part because it was acquired through traditional methods, i.e., listening,
attendance, and participation in traditional life.
124. See WILLIAMS, supra note 55. Williams traces Western civilization’s use of the
concept of savage, barbarian, and like concepts as to outsiders that justified actions taken
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that prohibits Indians from ever truly asserting their right to selfdetermination.125 Yet the courts still fail to truly acknowledge tribal
jurisdiction.126 This section stands in the federal court doors and looks at its
laws and history. The section critiques that body of law’s inherent inability
to protect Indians not only under the United States’ foundational precepts,
but also its resistance, or inability, to recognize indigenous concepts of
jurisprudence. To begin, a discussion of how my approach came about will
be useful.
A. What’s Wrong with This Scene?
Knowing many Native legal scholars caused me to realize several things.
Though the number of Indian legal academics is relatively few, they have
an illustrious combined resume: deans and professorships at leading law
schools, numerous articles and books, and national and international task
forces and commissions.127 Each of these scholars obviously thought deeply
with regards to the law and federal Indian law, in particular. Hearing of
their accomplishments, a person practicing daily in tribal law cannot help
but be inspired with what Indians achieved in the legal profession. Though I
graduated before most of these friends, as a young law graduate, I too had
thought I might pursue academia. As the years passed, it appeared such was
not my fate. I simply could not wrap my mind around the various themes
that run through federal Indian law in such a way as to make sense out of
the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudential treatment of Indians. For
instance, I could only describe the language used in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.

against exterior forces as being incorporated into American Indian jurisprudence in a way
that inherently devalues American Indians’ and tribes’ rights.
125. See WALTER ECHOHAWK, IN THE LIGHT OF JUSTICE (2013) [hereinafter ECHOHAWK,
LIGHT OF JUSTICE].
126. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-7, Dollar General v. Miss. Choctaw Tribe, 136
S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13–1496) (per curiam) [hereinafter Oral Argument, Dollar General]
(comments of Justice Kennedy) (questioning whether tribal courts had any jurisdiction over
non-Indians). The lower court decision was affirmed by an equally divided court due to the
passing of Justice Scalia. But for his passing, it seems likely tribal court jurisdiction over
non-Indians, even in civil matters, would have taken a serious blow.
127. As an example, being an American Indian graduate of Harvard Law School (HLS)
in 1985, to the best that can be determined, I was only about the twelfth modern era Indian
HLS graduate. However, in the period since my graduation, those Native graduates have
served in law professorships at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA),
University of New Mexico, University of Arizona, University of Colorado, and Harvard law
schools, as well as on the boards or commissions of the St. Lawrence Seaway, National
Legal Services Corporation, and the United Nations.
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United States as racist and paternalistic, and yet it remains valid Supreme
Court precedent:
No case in this Court has ever held that taking of Indian title or
use by Congress required compensation. The American people
have compassion for the descendants of those Indians who were
deprived of their homes and hunting grounds by the drive of
civilization. They seek to have the Indians share the benefits of
our society as citizens of this Nation. Generous provision has
been willingly made to allow tribes to recover for wrongs, as a
matter of grace, not because of legal liability.128
I continued to follow the federal case law developments but did not
attempt to write articles on the Court’s decisions. It seemed to me that
regardless of how one dressed up the Supreme Court decisions, the only
common precept was that Indians lost, which is hardly the stuff of fiftypage law reviews.129 While true that there was the occasional win for the
tribes, during my coming of age as an attorney in the 1980s through the
present, the Supreme Court seemed relentless in its anti-Indian rulings.130

128. 348 U.S. 272, 281-82 (1955). The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton went on to say:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were
deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians
ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was
not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.
Id. at 289-90. Yet this case remains cited precedent. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S.
262, 277 (2001); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 162 n.4 (1982) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
129. See ECHOHAWK, 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES, supra note 56, at 423 (noting “[t]he
Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) ruled against Indian tribes in 88% of the cases” and the current
Roberts Court appears to be following suit with no discernable doctrine).
130. Although there have been victories, the definite trend has been negative: Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that tribal courts lack jurisdiction to
criminally prosecute non-Indians for crimes on tribal lands); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that tribal courts could not entertain civil action against an
allegedly negligent non-member driver and driver's employer for accidents that occurred on
a state highway right-of-way on the reservation); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)
(holding that a tribal court lacked jurisdiction over tribal member's civil rights and tort action
filed against state officials in their individual capacities for alleged violations in executing
search warrants on reservation); Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) (holding that Native Americans’ religious freedom rights were not violated by
Oregon employment law prohibiting Indians’ sacramental peyote use); Lyng v. N.W. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (permitting Forest Service timber
harvesting despite its impact upon three tribes’ traditional religious use). The expected
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All the various forms of Supreme Court doctrine—preemption, original
intent, inherent rights, stare decisis—seldom seemed to apply to tribal cases
when the doctrinal application would require a ruling in favor of Indians or
tribes. The cases all just seemed paternalistic or worse, racist.
At the Federal Bar Association Annual Indian Law Section Conference
in April of 2013, Professor Robert Williams discussed his book, Savage
Anxieties.131 I had not at that time read his book, but what I took from his
talk was that the roots of federal Indian law’s treatment of Indians and
Indian tribes grew out of Western civilization’s creation of a savage mythos
regarding outsiders. My understanding was that this “savage” narrative goes
back to the earliest point in Ancient Greek/Western ideology, tracing
forward from Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. From that point forward, the
West saw those people outside of its borders as savages: unschooled,
illiterate, and without a civil form of society, merely wandering across the
lands they occupied. I heard the argument that the West had perceived itself
as having been in a constant struggle with these “savages.” Whatever
interrelationship the West had with, or whatever was done to, the savages,
was justified. This looking to the “other” not only shaped Western society
but explains the nature of federal Indian law when reviewing United States
Supreme Court decisions. What I took from his presentation was that from
the time of Chief Justice John Marshall132 forward, the Supreme Court
conceptually perceived Indians as falling outside the contours of “civil”
society. Indians were viewed merely as a people wandering across open
spaces without a society owed legal respect.
Regardless of whether this is precisely what Professor Williams meant, it
gave me a context to look at federal Indian law by dialectic juxtaposition to
our ball game meeting when my Chief had briefly laid out the nature of our
Euchee society.133 As well-respected scholars have already written
extensively about the nature of Indian law, there is little need to cover in
depth the federal case law. Nonetheless, to understand an alternative
approach to law recognizing an indigenous peoples’ jurisprudence, one
must include a critique of federal Indian law. These critiques arise from
negative outcome in Dollar General, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016), was certainly at the top of
Indian advocates’ recent fears.
131. WILLIAMS, supra note 55.
132. John Marshall, the fourth Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, served
from 1801-1835. His court laid the foundations of federal Indian law in the cases of Johnson
v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
133. See supra Section III.B.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/2

No. 1]

A JURISGENERATIVE TAIL

45

federal Indian law being internally inconsistent as well as containing selfgenerated justifications of federal actions. Federal Indian law generally
lacks moral or ethical treatment of Indians. Other critiques are derived from
its basis in prior federal, English, or European doctrines founded in
colonialism and/or racism.134 This is most particularly exemplified by the
plenary power that allows Congress to take actions towards tribes, such as
termination of their tribal status, without risk of the actions being found
unconstitutional.135 This is because the federal-tribal relationship is political
in nature and thus not reviewable by the federal courts.136 Accordingly, let
134. “Colonialism” and “racism” are not lightly used terms here. “Colonialism” is the
ideology that justifies an exterior people in using force to appropriate land, resources, and
even people for the benefit of themselves and at the expense of the original people of the
locale. “Racism” is the suppression or subjugation of a people by another merely due to their
race. Both ideologies come into play with Native Americans.
135. Plenary power was articulated in Cotton Petroleum as deriving from the Indian
Commerce Clause: “[T]he central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide
Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.” Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (citations omitted) (citing Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974); FELIX COHEN’s HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
207-08 & nn. 2, 3, 9-11 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982)). Some Indian scholars,
though, now argue that “Congressional plenary power is nothing more than the power
necessary to govern Indian affairs.” MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 43
(2016); see also id. at 43-45. For instance, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lara used
the plenary power to find Congress had the authority to legislate tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians: “Congress, with this Court's approval, has interpreted the
Constitution's ‘plenary’ grants of power as authorizing it to enact legislation that both
restricts and, in turn, relaxes those restrictions on tribal sovereign authority.” 541 U.S. 193,
202 (2004). However, even as the Court is finding plenary power as a source for
congressional authority that enhances tribal jurisdiction, the Court goes on in the same
paragraph to clearly lay out how this power, even if in some instances limited, betrays the
right of tribes to true self-determination:
After all, the Government's Indian policies, applicable to numerous tribes with
diverse cultures, affecting billions of acres of land, of necessity would fluctuate
dramatically as the needs of the Nation and those of the tribes changed over
time. See, e.g., Cohen 48. And Congress has in fact authorized at different
times very different Indian policies (some with beneficial results but many with
tragic consequences). Congressional policy, for example, initially favored
“Indian removal,” then “assimilation” and the breakup of tribal lands, then
protection of the tribal land base (interrupted by a movement toward greater
state involvement and “termination” of recognized tribes).
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court noted Congress’s authority to act in the
“needs of the Nations,” even when tribes obviously did not approve or desire such actions
and where the actions were not in the tribes’ best interests.
136. Id. at 205.
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us first understand the perspective with which U.S. law has approached
Indian nations. Once this is recognized we can see if some other approach
might differ, and upon this awareness, seek to understand an “other”
jurisprudence.
Professor Williams’s argument was in line with Supreme Court cases
that had bothered me since my undergraduate and law school classes. One
need only look at some Supreme Court cases to see references to the
“savage” nature of Indians and the justification for treatment of Indians.
Thus, in In re Heff, the Supreme Court stated:
In the early dealings of the government with the Indian tribes the
latter were recognized as possess[ing] some of the attributes of
nations, with which the former made treaties, and the policy of
the government was, sometimes by treaties and sometimes by
the use of force, to put a stop to the wanderings of these tribes
and locate them on some definite territory or reservation, there
establishing for them a communal or tribal life.137
In contrast, the Court in United States v. Joseph had doubts as to whether
certain laws applied to the Taos Pueblo because, to the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Taos seemed scarcely Indian in nature:
Their names, their customs, their habits, are similar to those of
the people in whose midst they reside, or in the midst of whom
their pueblos are situated. The criminal records of the courts of
the Territory scarcely contain the name of a pueblo Indian. In
short, they are a peaceable, industrious, intelligent, honest, and
virtuous people. They are Indians only in feature, complexion,
and a few of their habits; in all other respects superior to all but a
few of the civilized Indian tribes of the country, and the equal of
the most civilized thereof.138
Fortunately for the Pueblos’ status as Indians, by the time of United States
v. Sandoval, the Court found the Pueblo Indians “like reservation Indians in
general; that, although industrially superior, they are intellectually and
morally inferior to many of them.”139 Thus, the Court felt justified in

137. 197 U.S. 488, 498 (1905) (emphasis added).
138. 94 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1876) (emphasis added).
139. 231 U.S. 28, 41 (1913).
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determining the Pueblos were subject to the rules applied to other
Indians.140
To me, Professor Williams’s analysis made sense as he tracked the flow
of Western civilization’s reaction to the “other,” the savages. This went a
long way towards explaining why I could not find a rational thread to
explain Supreme Court Indian law precedent. It also clarified that much of
the great recent scholarship is looking at Indian law to see out of where it
grew and how it relates to others.141 Professor Williams looks to the
development of Western civilization.142 Other works look to how current
Supreme Court law ignores the foundational cases and relationships with
the tribes at the beginning of the United States143 or where current
indigenous rights (whether cases, administrative, or statutory) fit within the
developing international norms.144 Each of these genera are necessary to
understanding the need to revisit the foundation of Indian law. However, it
was not how I had internalized Indian law.
These problematic Supreme Court doctrines are not simply remnants of a
past, disavowed legacy. The 2016 grant of certiorari in Dollar General v.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians145 crystallized my concerns of all the
problems still running through federal Indian law. The oral arguments
before the United States Supreme Court laid out the proposition from
several justices that tribes constitutionally lacked authority over nonIndians:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You say this is in the
heartland? We have never before recognized Indian court -court jurisdiction over a nonmember, have we?
....

140. These cases go to the arguments both for and against culture as sovereignty. The
Supreme Court already used culture to decide whether Indians were Indians. Unfortunately,
the Court decided being Indian meant they were culturally inferior.
141. Admittedly, mine is a rather limited sphere of knowledge as I did not, and do not,
review legal scholarship on a regular basis. However, my friends that are respected scholars
in the field of Indian law keep me generally abreast of their writings.
142. See WILLIAMS, supra note 55, at 8-9.
143. See ECHOHAWK, LIGHT OF JUSTICE, supra note 125.
144. S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move
Toward the Multicultural State, 21 AZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 13, 14 (2004).
145. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
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JUSTICE SCALIA: That's dictum. Dictum is dictum. Dictum
doesn't make something a heartland.146
JUSTICE KENNEDY: — can't get off square one.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: . . . I'm very pleased to discuss the
threshold point, and that is that, with respect to nonmembers, the
Tribes do not have the authority to subject us to such sweeping
tort law duties.147
Dollar General presented a clear view of just how broad the attack upon
tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians was in the Supreme Court. The
Dollar General attack was only spared through the death of Justice Scalia
resulting in a four-to-four Court decision, thus affirming without decision
the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in favor of tribal jurisdiction.148 As Congress has
plenary power over tribes, and the justices have expressed doubts as to
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, I, as a tribal judge, was left to wonder
where any protections remained for tribal courts and native institutions in
general.
The plenary power doctrine is often used by Indian advocates as a
mechanism to push state interference out of Indian Country.149 However,
while being a potential tool, this still runs the risk that plenary power can be
turned against tribes at any time. In this respect, plenary power is no
different than what a powerful, respected, traditional Muscogee Indian
doctor (i.e., medicine man) once asked me:
Do you know why the people down south (meaning Muscogee
people) respect me as a doctor? It is not because I am good, it is
because I am powerful. These medicines can be used for good or
bad, it is the person who is good or bad.150
This is what some of my elder Euchees meant when they said that while we
no longer have some of those old medicines, we also do not have to worry
about them being misused. Plenary power puts a powerful tool in the hands
of people whom we have no idea as to whether they are good or bad and
over whom we have no control as to how they may use their tool.

146.
147.
148.
2014).
149.
150.

Oral Argument, Dollar General, supra note 126, at 29-30.
Id. at 7-8.
See Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir.
See supra note 135.
Personal Conversation with Muscogee Doctor (early 1980s).
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B. Shawjwane Tries to Be a Bear151
Felix S. Cohen appeared to recognize early on the potential problem of
the American judiciary being unable to comprehend the nature of traditional
governmental structures’ legitimacy and thus the need to orient towards that
which was familiar in Anglo-American terms. In Drafting of Tribal
Constitutions,152 while discussing the place of traditional chiefs in creating
tribal constitutions pursuant to the then-new IRA legislation, Cohen makes
relevant notes in passing. Despite the number of tribes with fading
traditional structures leading to lesser applicability, Cohen makes
comments that certain terms “are offered as examples of the way in which
ancient powers may be given modern names that a white man’s court and
white officials are likely to respect.”153 Still, Cohen made attempts to
accommodate the place of these traditional officials and institutions within
the proposed constitutional considerations under the new IRA
governments.154 It appears, unfortunately, the actual drafters of tribal
constitutions in the 1930s (the BIA and consultants) failed to follow
Cohen’s lead of utilizing traditional systems where such were still relatively
intact.
Current federal law works to provide protections to Native peoples and
yet creates systemic processes that suppress development of indigenous
institutions. The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013
(VAWA)155 allows tribal court criminal prosecution of non-Indians for
violations of protective orders protecting Indians within Indian Country. 156
Indian Country suffers a disproportionate rate of domestic violence,
primarily against women. There are many causes for this, but one factor is
that many incidents of violence are from non-Indian males against Indian
women. However, under the Supreme Court ruling in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,157 tribes cannot criminally prosecute non-Indian
perpetrators. VAWA was an overdue change in allowing tribes to
potentially control their territory. Federal law cracked the door again,
allowing some instances where there is tribal criminal jurisdiction over non151. In another di’ile, when Rabbit has his friend Bear over, he tries to mimic Bear while
cooking but in doing so, ends up hurting himself. Bear has to remind his friend that he is
Rabbit and not to do the things Bear does.
152. COHEN, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 62.
153. Id. at 38.
154. Id. at 37-39.
155. Tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
156. Id. sec. 904, § 204, 127 Stat. at 120 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304).
157. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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Indians.158 The hope for Indian tribes is, of course, that successful
implementation of VAWA will allow further reversals of Oliphant’s
limitation of tribal courts’ jurisdiction over non-Indians.
To take advantage of VAWA’s prosecution over non-Indians, the tribe
must adopt strict due process rights specified in the Act. Most of what a
tribal court does resembles the work of state or federal courts, but the
differences are what make tribal courts unique.159 Regardless of whether a
tribe provides fairness using its own process, Congress determined tribes
must track the federal system such that VAWA incorporates a near identical
process to those of the federal courts. These requirements are occasionally
more rigorous than state requirements. In criminal proceedings subject to
enhanced sentencing of non-Indian defendants, this requires that the judge
presiding over the criminal proceeding have sufficient legal training to
preside over criminal proceedings.160 There is no such requirement found in
Oklahoma law. Further, the judge must be “licensed to practice law by any

158. I write “again” as despite the Court’s musings in Oliphant, in the earliest days of the
republic, at least some Indian tribes clearly were recognized as having the right to punish
non-members:
If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian, shall
attempt to settle on any of the lands allotted to the Wiandot and Delaware
nations in this treaty, except on the lands reserved to the United States in the
preceding article, such person shall forfeit the protection of the United States,
and the Indians may punish him as they please.
Treaty with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa, and Ottawa Nations, art. V, Jan. 21, 1785, 7
Stat. 16.
If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian, shall
attempt to settle on any of the Creeks lands, such person shall forfeit the
protection of the United States, and the Creeks may punish him or not, as they
please.
Treaty with the Creek Nation, art. VI, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35.
If any person or persons, citizens or subjects of the United States, or any other
person not being an Indian, shall presume to settle upon the lands confirmed to
the said nations, he and they shall be out of the protection of the United States;
and the said nations may punish him or them in such manner as they see fit.
Treaty with the Wiandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima, and Sac Nations, art.
IX, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 28.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14. See also RICHLAND, supra note 12
(showing how the Hopi Court uses an adversarial process adopted from the American legal
system to settle disputes between Hopi claimants, yet incorporates traditional law and
presentation into the court proceedings).
160. 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (Westlaw through Pub L. No. 115-231).
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jurisdiction in the United States”161 (which would exclude most traditional
practitioners from the bench). VAWA requires that a tribal court enhanced
special criminal jurisdiction jury must “reflect a fair cross section of the
community”162 (meaning the jury must include non-Indians, i.e., noncitizens of the tribe), whereas federal or state courts may exclude noncitizens from their juries.
The requirements that come along with enhanced sentencing authority all
install an Anglo-American system and thus normalize non-traditional
systems. This also makes review by a federal court easier, as tribal court
procedures must track federal process. Any variance from the standard used
in federal court prosecutions and American jurisprudence seems more
likely to be a basis for tribal court reversal. If the tribal statutory process
must track the federal system, a tribal court case varying from the process
used by the federal court would naturally mean something was done
incorrectly, even if the tribal action was clearly articulable based on
traditional indigenous due process. The variance in process would seem all
too likely to be fatal to the tribal proceeding. This does not mean tribal
courts would have systems different from U.S. courts, but they are now
prohibited from consideration of such indigenous processes if they wish to
implement VAWA jurisdiction over non-native domestic violence
perpetrators. Thus, fear of reversal on a federal habeas proceeding will have
a chilling effect, meaning either the tribal court must move towards an
Anglo-American system or try to create a bifurcated system where Indians
get one system and non-Indians get another.
By combining a growing awareness of a tribal jurisprudence with
knowledge of Supreme Court case law, a pattern emerges. The Supreme
Court’s line of reasoning seems to run: Indians are inferior because they are
different;163 since Indians are different, they cannot be trusted;164 if Indians
are like us we might trust them;165 and, since they do not really have any
161. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, § 234(c)(3), 124
Stat. 2261, 2280 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302).
162. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 113-4,
sec. 904, § 204, 127 Stat. 54, 120 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304).
163. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
164. Oral Argument, Dollar General, supra note 126, at 11-17 (acknowledging that the
Choctaw tribal court deserves respect, but that others have no respect due them). “There are,
however, many tribes, everyone agrees, that don't have anything like that.” Id. at 11; see also
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978) (holding that the tribes
might try non-Indians by an external and unknown code (as the federal courts do Indians)
and thus criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is not part of tribal sovereignty).
165. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
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culture left, we can ignore their claimed special rights as merely being
racial classifications.166 Since so much is at risk, the fear is we Indians must
not raise culture as foundation for our rights. That risks us losing our
sovereignty when we no longer have that culture. Of course, if we are
unable or unwilling to raise our culture as a basis for our right to continue
when that was a basis for so many of our battles, such as Chitto Harjo and
his movement, then we have already lost our political sovereignty. We
would be acceding to the reasoning of those who wish to take away our
existence. We must create a federal legal ecosystem that allows traditional
jurisprudence to grow. Currently, that is not the case. This must change.
As W. Richard West explains, “[p]olitical sovereignty and cultural
sovereignty are inextricably linked, because the ultimate goal of political
sovereignty is protecting a way of life.”167 Cultural sovereignty is a fact
with the Euchee and Muscogee. Despite being punished for speaking the
language, having our ceremonies deemed “Satan’s work” or outlawed, and
having our traditional ways suppressed, we have continued to dance and
speak our language during the period from Oklahoma’s statehood in 1906
to the present. In contra-distinction, when our courts were outlawed and
governments suppressed by the Curtis Act of 1898, our tribal politicians for
the most part disappeared or acquiesced in the federal system. Our
traditional ceremonial leaders never asked permission to be Indian. That is a
lesson worth remembering when determining to whom we look for
guidance on whether current federal law protects us.
V. The International Effort and Traditional Jurisprudence
We looked at how to find sources of traditional jurisprudence and a few
examples of what those sources can teach.168 We then saw how, in contrast,
current federal law, through its foundation in racism, lack of respect, and
the ability to subject tribes to total defeasance, limits the recognition of
Indian institutions and traditional jurisprudence. Assuming success in
discovering or articulating Indians’ traditional jurisprudence, how do we
succeed in assertion of Indians’ traditional rights: those communal,
culturally-based conceptions of law? I believe that the UNDRIP must be
166. See Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 12, at 202.
167. Id.
168. A Cherokee language instructor (probably Durbin Feeling) used to say that in
Cherokee, difficulties, problems, or hard times were also called “teachers” (dideyohsgi),
literally meaning “the one that handles broken things,” per David Comingdeer, chief at the
Cherokee New Echota Ceremonial Grounds. This certainly seems applicable to the road
faced by traditional practitioners and implementation of their legal concepts into Indian law.
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used by us sitting in our tribal arbors, camps, and communities (i.e., those
of us still trying to live in our tribal societies). I will look at an effort to
implement the UNDRIP internally and how seeking to domesticate the
internal and international human rights dialogues into federal Indian law
may create a sustainable future for traditional societies.
Huge challenges exist in achieving recognition of rights that diverge
from mainstream conceptions, such as a communal ownership that the
ceremonial fireplace belongs to no one but rather is, itself, a living part of
the tribal town with the rights of a living being.169 Walter Echohawk, in In
the Courts of the Conqueror, discusses in depth four cases that illustrate the
state and federal courts’ current inability to recognize, comprehend, or
protect traditional Native American religious or spiritual rights.170 These
issues arise, at least in part, because of the occasionally significant
differences between ours and the United States’ fundamental perceptions of
religion and spirituality.
Prime among these, at least for Euchees and Muscogees, are differences
between the Stomp Dance religion and Christianity. The following oversimplification illustrates a basic distinction from our point of view.
Christianity can be a belief-based system; that is, it mostly requires one to
believe something as opposed to requiring one to take action. In
contradistinction is the stomp dance/Green Corn religion, where the actions
themselves are part of that which is sacred. Thus, outsiders cannot force
Christians to just stop believing in Christ. However, with the Stomp Dance
religion, if you are unable to carry out a particular dance, at a particular
place (the stomp grounds), at a certain time, you may be unable to continue
your religion.171
This notion is best illustrated by our dances at the Euchee Polecat
Grounds. Those dances must be done at our stomp grounds with our
fireplace that we brought with us from our last tribal grounds near
Columbus, Georgia, in the 1830s. We have obviously moved the grounds in
the past, the last time being in 1936. Doing so was a hard and spiritual
undertaking. Unfortunately, those Euchee who knew how to properly move
169. This grant of rights to spiritual beings, while foreign to Anglo-American law, has
now occurred in New Zealand law with a river being granted human rights. “The New
Zealand parliament passed the bill recognising the Whanganui River, in North Island, as a
living entity.” New Zealand River First in the World to Be Given Legal Human Status, BBC
(Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39282918 (last visited Dec. 11,
2017).
170. ECHOHAWK, 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES, supra note 56, at 237-394.
171. See infra Section III.B (discussing issues raised at Kellyville Mekvlke meeting).
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the fireplace and the grounds are no longer with us. If for some reason we
no longer have access to the place the fire is now located, we cannot dance.
From what I have been told by my Muscogee friends, that is true for them,
as well. If we cannot dance, then we do not have our religion. These sacred
site issues172 are fundamentally different than religious practices typically
understood, and protected, in western legal thought.173 In traditional tribal
religions, at least within the Muscogee and Euchee, it is not merely belief,
but location, action, and continuation of the songs, dances, and the
relationship to the ceremonial fireplace, that are fundamental aspects of the
religion.174
Traditional societal precepts are just beginning to receive legitimate
consideration in various western legal systems, as shown by the initial
proceedings in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
regarding traditional cultural expressions, traditional knowledge, and
genetic resources.175 These otherwise dry, technical, international
conventions and their national counterpart, the United States’ Patent and
Trade Office, deal with property rights going to the heart of many
traditional indigenous concerns. As a result, the National Congress of
172. Curiously, until I began the MDRIP project, I had not thought of our grounds in
terms of “sacred site” issues. To me, it was simply the grounds where we held our dances,
had our family camps, and looked forward to gathering to visit with family and friends while
carrying on our people. Sacred sites, in contrast, were what other Indians had at places like
Kootenai Falls, Bear Butte, or the Navajo’s sacred mountains. Thus, this work helps to both
focus thoughts and conceptualize how some of our own ways fit within the larger, exterior
context.
173. See ECHOHAWK, 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES, supra note 56, at 237-394.
174. Many of our elders who have gone on used to say that if you wanted to dance (i.e.,
stomp dance), you had a place where you could dance. By this, they meant that the
ceremonial grounds were where you should dance, not out in public. There are some grounds
that do have public fundraiser dances; however, there are a significant number of others who
are opposed to such dances away from the fireplace.
175. See Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Thirty-Third Session, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=42298 (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
WIPO’s website explains:
The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore is, in accordance with its
mandate, undertaking text-based negotiations with the objective of reaching
agreement on a text(s) of an international legal instrument(s), which will ensure
the effective protection of traditional knowledge (TK), traditional cultural
expressions (TCEs) and genetic resources (GRs).
Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
tk/en/igc/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
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American Indians (NCAI), the largest and one of the oldest national Indian
organizations, enacted a resolution committing itself to participation and
monitoring of WIPO efforts.176 In confronting these issues, at least two of
the Muscogee Grounds Mekvlke expressed opinions they wished to be
understood by those who would present or represent Native interests to
WIPO. Meko Bill Proctor and Meko George Thompson directed the author
to submit their thoughts to a working group, which in part reads:
Our songs, these belong to our old medicine people. (meaning
the ones who have already passed on) They are not to be played
with. They (songs / dances / medicine) belong to the grounds,
not out in public. Our Grounds are in remote areas, not out in
public. We want people to come to us, not send our ways out in
the public. Our old people used to say if you want to dance, you
have a place. (Meaning at the Ceremonial Grounds, and the
Grounds only.) This is how they look at these things belonging
to them, not to others.177
These are issues which must be put forward under a new understanding
of legal rights found in some exterior source, such as in the UNDRIP, for
domestication into federal Indian law.178 In relation to traditional society, it
is a matter of fighting off extinction and understanding what we might yet
retain from our past. That is why when we argue for the development of a
new era of Indian rights, we must look in the first instance to the spiritual
and cultural foundations that we bring from our traditional past. If we can
validate these rights that made us what we are, then asserting our economic
and governmental rights will also follow.
176. The resolution states:
WHEREAS, the USPTO’s WIPO negotiating positions and text assert that it
has the authority to unilaterally abrogate, diminish or impinge upon tribal
sovereign authority, by subjecting indigenous traditional knowledge and
traditional cultural expressions to claims by non-tribal citizens, entities, and
governments to access and use indigenous traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions without indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed
consent, and in contravention of tribal treaties and other federal law . . . .
Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Resolution #PHX-16-054, at 2 (Oct. 2016), http://www.
ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_ZlGiMHNGVtAbKpBODZObysfdKgbkPYPgDGnKYMSi
gaCfeNCnOlP_PHX-16-054%20final.pdf.
177. The words in italics are my additions explaining the Mekvlke’s words for those not
present during the drafting.
178. See UNDRIP, supra note 4, art. 11, 12, 31 (concerning religious and spiritual
rights).
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In exploring the status of tribes, the various terms used are not always
easily defined. The United States Supreme Court stated in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez that Indian tribes remain “[s]eparate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution.”179 “Sovereign” recognizes the political status of
tribes. However, “domestic dependent nation”, “tribe”, and even “sovereign
nation”180 are thrown about without agreement or understanding of
precisely what such terms mean,181 how they came about, or what they infer
as to a change from a prior status at some reference point in the past. Some
advocates prefer the term “nation” over the use of “tribe,” and it is likely
that some tribes would seem to qualify for nationhood status (due to
territory, population, and history), but for being within the current United

179. 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
180. The Court stated in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia:
[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be
denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
There are great difficulties hanging over the question, whether they can be
considered as states under the judiciary article of the constitution. They never
have been recognized as holding sovereignty over the territory they occupy. It
is in vain now to inquire into the sufficiency of the principle, that discovery
gave the right of dominion over the country discovered.
Id. at 22.
181. The Court stated in Worcester v. Georgia:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any
other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates
imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term “nation,” so
generally applied to them, means “a people distinct from others.” The
constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to
be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among
those powers who are capable of making treaties. The words “treaty” and
“nation” are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and
legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well
understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied
them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
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States system.182 Such an approach, however, affirms the argument that
when we discuss a tribe, it is culturally inferior or less civil than status as a
nation.183 “Tribalism” is already used to infer a negative status, such as
when a nation’s factions “descend into tribalism,” denoting internal battles.
However, “tribal” should simply describe a different societal structure.184
When grounds people think of the relationships and culture they wish to
preserve, I believe they understand it in terms of tribal relations and see this
indigenous structure under threat by mainstream society, whether directly
or simply by immersion within the dominant society. For Euchee
ceremonial people, “tribal” embodies the historic practices of the Euchee in
a way that nation does not. To be clear, this does not mean a few, some, or
most tribes are not nations.185 Rather, we should be free to use whichever
term, or terms, we wish, without regard to repercussions as to our
continuity, rights, and place within the United States.
Perhaps, though, it helps to know what the Muscogee and Euchee
originally had so we can understand what we do, or do not, have today. The
Muscogee tribal towns had allegiances and affiliations with each other and
joined into affiliations forming the Muscogee Confederacy (now Nation)

182. The use of “Indian nations” instead of “Indian tribes” has political overtones in
asserting an enhanced status beyond being a mere racial classification and is in line with
Chief Justice Marshall’s decisions referring to Indians as “domestic dependent nations.”
Indian tribes are also found within the treaty-making clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Nations, not ethnic groups, make treaties.
183. Interestingly, Native advocates often push for use of the terms “Native American,”
“Indigenous,” or “First Nations” (primarily in Canada) because “Indian” is perceived as
mistakenly applied due to Columbus believing he had arrived in the far east or India. Yet,
the use of “tribe” is readily abandoned despite it being so tied to indigenous institutions or
structures.
184. See UNDRIP, supra note 4, art. 5 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain
and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions . . . .”).
Whatever the nature of indigenous peoples’ societal structure, their inherent rights should
remain.
185. It is likely true that some Indian nations/tribes are no longer tribal, or at least a
significant portion of their membership is no longer tribal in the cultural/societal sense.
Native American tribal culture and our vision of community flows from our traditional
ceremonial life that bound together and created our tribal life. From that core, regardless of
its spiritual source, came the unifying force of us as a people. As those traditions slip away,
so too slips away our tribal existence. Thus, the worry of my old people about the end of our
dances being the end of our world seems to have foreshadowed the world we now face. See
also DELORIA, supra note 99, at 243 (discussing how tribes are no longer being formed on
“social, religious, or cultural bases”).
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prior to formation of the United States.186 Each town had a Meko and
council and governed itself. Even after joining into confederation, for a
time at least, the towns could go to war independently of each other. At
least by the 1820s, a stronger, unified system was in place such that treaties
were not deemed valid unless agreed to by the confederacy’s council.187
The tribal towns do not seem to fit within a neat definition of nation,
although the confederacy would certainly seem to have qualified at some
point. The tribes are not alone in this ambiguity. The nation-state is a
relatively modern construct, flowing out of Western political thought
explaining the European transformation of kingdoms into centralized
governments that led to colonizing governments.188
They, however, are not the only models of political organization derived
from a Western political-historical context. The ancient Greek city-states
were politically not nations, but rather collections of towns or villages ruled
by various mechanisms (kings, tyrants, oligarchy, republic) that shared
culture and (perhaps) language. Of course, northern Italy consisted of citystates at least through the time of European expansion in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries. Thus, it should be irrelevant whether Indian tribes can
be styled nations in their prior, free incarnations. Indigenous peoples should
have the same right to existence and self-determination, regardless of
whether their political structures were at one time tribes, city-states,
nations, theocracies, or some other form.189
While UNDRIP article 3 recognizes our fundamental right to exist, the
Declaration also affirms our right to use our own institutional definitions
186. ANGIE DEBO, THE ROAD TO DISAPPEARANCE: A HISTORY OF THE CREEK INDIANS 4
(1941).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92 (stating that Chief McIntosh was executed
because of his signing without Confederacy authority a treaty with the United States).
188. According to the Wikipedia article on nation-states:
The idea of a nation state was and is associated with the rise of the modern
system of states, often called the “Westphalian system” in reference to the
Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The balance of power, which characterized that
system, depended on its effectiveness upon clearly defined, centrally
controlled, independent entities, whether empires or nation states, which
recognize each other's sovereignty and territory. The Westphalian system did
not create the nation state, but the nation state meets the criteria for its
component states (by assuming that there is no disputed territory).
Nation State, WIKIPEDIA, https://web.archive.org/web/20181105051239/https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Nation_state (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
189. See UNDRIP, supra note 4, art. 3 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”).
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without worrying about political consequences. Perhaps, with a shift in the
terminology under an alternative approach to indigenous people in the
United States, such as via use of the UNDRIP, the term “peoples” can
better recognize tribes’ internally derived structures and institutions. We
may be sovereigns as recognized by treaty-making but adopting the use of
“peoples” allows us to focus on strengthening and preserving our native
institutions without the need to meet external criteria such as nationhood.
We would not risk losing rights to our continued tribal existence. Professor
James Anaya, former U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, noted the various social or governmental structures used by
indigenous peoples, yet those groups still fell within the context of human
rights:
Indigenous peoples are entitled to be different but are not
necessarily to be considered a priori unconnected from larger
social and political structures. Rather, indigenous groups –
whether characterized as communities, peoples, nations, or
other – are appropriately viewed as simultaneously distinct from,
yet part of, larger units of social and political interaction, units
that may include indigenous federations, the states within which
they live and the global community itself.190
While translating the UNDRIP into Mvskoke, the Mekvlke translators
noted the tribal towns are referred to as “etvlwv.” This same word also
refers to the Muscogee Nation and other tribes. It also means your (or
others’) community or people and additionally could be used to generically
refer to foreign nations or people.191 Thus, not only can we define ourselves
but better articulate to others what it means to be a “people” and in the
process, perhaps, illustrate our human right to exist as a people as
recognized in article 3 of the Declaration.192
With all the foregoing as background, the question remains: are there
models for shifting federal law regarding Indian tribes? The Native
American Rights Fund (NARF) has an ongoing Supreme Court Project that
works to coordinate major Indian law litigation going up to or in the United
190. Anaya, supra note 144, at 60 (emphasis added).
191. There was some uncertainty as to using Etvlwv to refer to foreign nations, though
some seemed to feel it was appropriate. Perhaps this is only fair, as some legal scholars
might be uncomfortable with the use of nation to refer to Indian tribes.
192. UNDRIP, supra note 4, art. 3 (recognizing indigenous “peoples” as having the right
to self-determination means, in the United States, federally recognized tribes have an
inherent right to exist, a far firmer existence than under current federal law).
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States Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court Project, a muchneeded effort due to the Supreme Court’s anti-Indian orientation over the
last decades, is more tactical than strategic:
The purpose of the Project is to strengthen tribal advocacy
before the U.S. Supreme Court by developing new litigation
strategies and coordinating tribal legal resources, and to
ultimately improve the win-loss record of Indian tribes.193
The Project works to coordinate a national tribal response to each case as it
arises, and considering the negative bent of the Supreme Court, hopefully
avoid further damaging court decisions.
Yet a strategic dialogue is needed to shift Indian law to a human rights
basis that as a starting point recognizes our inherent right to exist, and that
mandates true consultation and consent on matters affecting Indians. If one
looks for such broad, coordinated, future-oriented planning, there is a
remarkably empty landscape on the national level. The leading Indian
advocacy organizations, Native American Rights Fund, National Congress
of American Indians, Association on American Indian Affairs, National
American Indian Court Judges Association, and National Indian Child
Welfare Association, do not at this time appear to have such an effort.194
Fortunately, Walter Echohawk lays out how to do this in In the Light of
Justice.195 He uses the example of the NAACP’s civil rights game plan for
erasing the legal yokes of “separate but equal” created by Plessy v.
Ferguson.196 The NAACP used strategy, organization, and litigation to lay
the groundwork that ultimately resulted in Brown v. Board of Education.197
Echohawk argues that tribes need to develop a similar plan to assert their
right to self-determination by utilizing the Declaration.198
The next question, then, is what would a strategic plan for Indian
Country entail? First and foremost is creating a dialogue on the Declaration
193. Tribal Supreme Court Project, NATIVE AM. RTS. FUND, http://sct.narf.org/
?_ga=1.34983073.1420456592.1488306370 (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
194. The Native American Rights Fund (NARF) and the University of Colorado Law
School (CU Law) appear to be in the proto-stages of developing a joint effort at a broad
revision of Indian law based on domesticating the UNDRIP into the federal system. NARF
and CU Law understand this will be a long-term project but are only in the very beginning
stages of discussion as of the time of this writing.
195. ECHOHAWK, LIGHT OF JUSTICE, supra note 125.
196. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
197. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
198. See ECHOHAWK, LIGHT OF JUSTICE, supra note 125, at 221-48 (chapter 9, “March
Toward Justice”).
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amongst tribal lawyers, advocates, and traditional and political leaders.
Among the various actors, one prong of that change must originate in tribal
courts. Tribal courts are always at the tip of the spear of attacks upon
sovereignty.199 Thus, they need to prepare for such attacks as part of a
strategy to assert indigenous rights as a human right to self-determination.
Although tribal courts are being attacked, they can also be a foundational
pillar supporting tribal existence. An articulated tribal court use of
traditional jurisprudence gives cover as to how we differ and why we
deserve latitude to redevelop our own institutions. With the input of
traditional people, tribal courts’ discourse on traditional and human rights
law might change social and legal understanding of tribal rights in the
federal courts.200 In this manner, assertion of culture merges with political
sovereignty. By tribal courts enunciating fundamentals of our justice,
especially those that are traditionally based, we lay out principles which
explain the need to implement the UNDRIP and, perhaps, provide tools that
Indian lawyers can utilize to correct Supreme Court jurisprudence attacking
tribal court jurisdiction. It might also, if carefully articulated, give tribes the
source of moral high ground, as freedom of religion is a foundational
principle of American conceptions of justice.201 Just as the NAACP used a
strategy to overturn Plessy, tribal courts must play a necessary part in a
coherent and coordinated effort to implement inherent human rights of
indigenous peoples into federal law. A tribal court’s explanation of the
tribes’ unique society, culture, and history as applied to a case it is handling
protects tradition by respecting tribal institutions. For example, using
precepts earlier discussed, a tribal court by metaphorical use of Shawjwane
and Gojithla shows how tribal friendship norms were violated.
199. See Oral Argument, Dollar General, supra note 126 (regarding tribal court tort
claim over non-Indian on reservation activities); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997) (holding tribal court jurisdiction not allowed over Indian claim against non-Indian for
car wreck on reservation right-of-way); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978) (holding that Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and
to punish non-Indians).
200. See ECHOHAWK, LIGHT OF JUSTICE, supra note 125, at 235-36 (citing Thurgood
Marshall and the effect that law had upon social change).
201. Most traditional based discussions would flow out of a tribe’s religious or spiritual
background. Paradoxically, the U.S. recognition of freedom of religion would thus be
supporting the religion of the tribe. However, the tribes are not prohibited from having their
own tribally recognized religion. See Indian Civil Rights Act § 202, 25 U.S.C. § 1302
(2012). While the Act tracks the federal Bill of Rights, it does not include prohibitions
against the establishment of religion, as many tribes still merge their governmental and
religious systems.
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International human rights law, as laid out in the UNDRIP, recognizes
indigenous peoples’ right to their own institutions.202 As such, the UNDRIP
expresses that a state cannot unilaterally terminate tribal existence and that
free, prior, and informed consent must be sought in matters that affect
indigenous peoples as tribal peoples. Perhaps the UNDRIP’s most
important right of indigenous peoples is contained in article 3, which
effectively recognizes the inherent right to exist: “Indigenous peoples have
the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”203 Another powerful provision of clear consequence for
tribes is the right to “free, prior, and informed consent” (FPIC) before states
take actions that impact indigenous peoples.204 This requirement of FPIC
was, in part, the basis for the statement of November 4, 2016, on the Dakota
Access Pipeline (DAPL) by Mr. Alvaro Pop Ac, Chair of the Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues, and Dr. Dalee Dorough and Chief Edward
John, Expert Members of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues,
expressing their deep concerns over the DAPL and the effect upon the
Standing Rock Sioux.205 Taken together, the rights expressed in these
articles could either overturn the concept of federal plenary power over
tribes or at least restrict federal plenary power that authorizes unconsented
action to the detriment of tribes.
A. Mvskoke Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Rights—MDRIP
On September 29th, 2016, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation signed into law
the Mvskoke Este Catvlke Vhakv Empvtakv Enyekcetv Cokv (Mvskoke
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).206 While I had for some
time been thinking of the UNDRIP and what it might mean to our
202. UNDRIP, supra note 4, arts. 5, 18, 20.
203. Id. art. 3. Elsewhere around the world the problem is the state denying the existence
of indigenous people. For instance, China and Russia both seem to have a proclivity to
classify indigenous people as merely being minority or ethnic populations. See China,
IWGIA, https://www.iwgia.org/en/china (last visited Sept. 30, 2018); Who Are the
Indigenous Peoples of Russia?, CULTURAL SURVIVAL, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/
news/who-are-indigenous-peoples-russia (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
204. UNDRIP, supra note 4, arts. 10, 11(2), 19, 28, 29(2), 32(2).
205. U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Statement on the Dakota Access
Pipeline (North Dakota, USA) by Mr. Alvaro Pop Ac, Chair of the Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues, and Dr. Dalee Dorough and Chief Edward John, Expert Members of the
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.un.org/esa/
socdev/unpfii/documents/2016/Docs-updates/StatementDAPL_4Nov-2016.pdf.
206. UNDRIP, supra note 4 (Mvskoke translation).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/2

No. 1]

A JURISGENERATIVE TAIL

63

ceremonial people within the Muscogee (Creek) Nation,207 the catalyst for
initiating meetings on a Muscogee DRIP (“MDRIP”) was the grant of
certiorari in Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw Tribe.208 This process
began in November of 2015 when I invited several of the Mekvlke of the
ceremonial grounds to meet and discuss the UNDRIP. The UNDRIP
addresses many issues of concern to the Muscogee Nation, including, from
the perspective of tribal courts, the right to our native institutions.209 The
UNDRIP, such as article 3 recognizing the inherent right to exist, is a
natural source to counter current Indian law. I knew, though, the strength
for Muscogee implementation would initially come from the ceremonial
leadership. The Declaration repeatedly addresses Indian concerns on
spirituality,210 sacred sites,211 medicines,212 and language,213 all of which are
issues to grounds people. However, this process had to be done in a proper
manner, so I contacted the Mekvlke from Alabama Grounds, Greenleaf
Grounds, Hickory Grounds, and the Tvstvnvke of Arbeka Grounds. They
came in and we talked informally about what the Declaration was, my
concerns and issues from a tribal court perspective and as a grounds
member, what their concerns might be, why it was important, and how it
might be of use in the Muscogee Nation with its commitment to ceremonial
life. I knew there were certain matters they were reluctant to publicly speak
about, so I was careful we would respect their rules and thoughts.214 They

207. I had written a note to myself sometime in the year before hosting the first meeting
raising the following point:
One issue I might raise with our chiefs is seeing what happens if we translate
parts of the UN docs into Muscogee and the dialogue which follows in
discussing it in Muscogee, and then re-translate that discussion back into
English to learn what the Ceremonial Grounds understand as the import of the
UNDRIP provisions. It could then be worth having a professor type meet with
them, if they wanted, to discuss how these documents offer opportunity for
protections for the concerns we have as traditional people.
Author notes.
208. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
209. UNDRIP, supra note 4, arts. 18, 20.
210. Id. arts. 8, 9, 11, 12, 25, 34.
211. Id. art. 11.
212. Id. arts. 24, 31.
213. Id. arts. 13, 14.
214. The Mekvlke generally are not interested in bridging the gap to mainstream society
with their ceremonial knowledge. In fact, a significant portion of the Mekvlke want to keep
it protected and preserved within the Muscogee people. They would rather their own people
know it and keep it out of the hands of non-Muscogee. There are, of course, some who share
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were understanding about the intent of the Declaration and how it might
benefit them and were very supportive of translating the UNDRIP into
Mvskoke. Thus, we continued to meet and discuss the UNDRIP. The
Mekvlke were quick to understand the UNDRIP’s intent and were
extremely supportive of translating and implementing the UNDRIP at the
Muscogee Nation.
After the first few meetings, we invited two of my friends and
colleagues, Walter Echohawk, and the now deceased Professor G. William
Rice, to meet with us and share their insights on the UNDRIP. They met
with the Mekvlke and explained how the Declaration came about and how
it fit in with international human rights. They explained how in 1977,
Phillip Deere, a Mvskoke (from Nuyaka Ceremonial Grounds) that the
Mekvlke knew well, went to Geneva, Switzerland, with a delegation of
traditional Native Americans and presented to the United Nations on the
need to protect indigenous peoples.215 That 1977 presentation was partially
responsible for initiating the process leading to the U.N. General Assembly
adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007. Phillip’s participation likely added a
legitimacy to efforts we were now undertaking.
B. Meeting of Mekvlke
As part of the UNDRIP effort, the Mekvlke and their assistants met in
January of 2016. Two things are worth noting about this meeting: the
substance presented and the process used in the meeting. As with other
Mekvlke meetings, there was generally a format common to discussion of
grounds business. The Meko will normally have one of his assistants or
members speak on his behalf, usually not speaking directly but rather
indicating what the speaker wishes while also explaining the Meko’s
desires or points as he understands them. Each person will speak in turn,
from start to finish, usually without interruption until all have spoken.
Discussion may then occur regarding the matters covered. This is not an
absolute format, but generally how matters proceed and how it occurred
(for the most part) at Kellyville.
As to substance, we invited Walter Echohawk to explain how the
UNDRIP might be of interest to the ceremonial grounds.216 He talked about
this freely and take it out to the general public, or at least share more than others. See supra
text accompanying note 174 (statement of Mekvlke Proctor and Thompson).
215. Ingrid Washinawatok, International Emergence: Twenty-One Years at the United
Nations, 3 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 41, 41 (1998).
216. G. William Rice was invited, but due to his health, was unable to attend.
Unfortunately, he passed away shortly thereafter before being able to see these efforts begin
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how the Declaration should be understood as aspirational, as it is not law,
but how it could eventually be a mechanism to incorporate tribal law into
federal law. He explained how it was conceived, crafted, and written with
input from traditional indigenous peoples from around the world, including
advocacy by Phillip Deere in 1977. He noted this was a potential
lawmaking moment (jurisgenerative) for us to turn our traditional, internal
laws into domestic law. While the other Mekvlke generally were not aware
of the Declaration, they were very cognizant of issues the Declaration
addresses. In listening to the Mekvlke’s discussion, Echohawk analyzed
their concerns and explained to them how the concerns they raised fell into
several broad issues addressed by various articles in the Declaration.
Echohawk noted if the UNDRIP carried the force of law, it would create a
mechanism for legally raising the Mekvlke issues within the United States.
Alternatively, even if not carrying the force of law, the UNDRIP raised
these traditional issues to the level of human rights concerns that could
require a formal response from the United States in international forums.
These issues, as raised by the Mekvlke, the corresponding UNDRIP articles
articulated by Echohawk, and how the articles cited by Echohawk might
address the Mekvlke concerns, are as follows:
Access to private land to gather medicine. These concerns corresponded
to rights articulated in articles 24 through 26. Here the grounds’ perspective
was that originally lands around them had been the Muscogee Nation's and
the grounds used these lands to gather necessary ceremonial medicines
since their arrival in Indian Territory in the 1830s. They looked at the
medicines as belonging to either no one, or to all, under an indigenous
perspective of traditional medicine plants. To them, these plants constituted
an inherent right to continue their religion in a way that American law does
not recognize. As more lands fall out of Indian ownership, finding access to
plants needed for traditional medicines becomes more difficult. Even
gathering of plants on highway easements has seen some grounds members
threatened.
Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines
and to maintain their health practices, including the conservation
of their vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals. Indigenous

to come to fruition. This type of undertaking was something we had discussed many times
over the years as an undertaking needed to move Indian law into the next era.
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individuals also have the right to access, without any
discrimination, to all social and health services.217
These articles might affect the current private property law conceptions of
plants necessary to accommodate continuing traditional lifestyles or
perhaps accommodate a non-Western perspective as to law and religion.
When coupled with the directives found in article 26(1) (“Indigenous
peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”),218 a
right begins to emerge that moves towards, at minimum, an accommodation
of gathering rights for the Muscogee and Euchee.
Continuing access to the Stompgrounds. These same articles, along with
articles 12, 24-26, and 28, might provide some rights for the continued
existence of the ceremonial grounds. These rights include: protection
against inaccessibility because of sale, inheritance, or simply locking the
gated access to the grounds. In the recent past, certain ceremonial grounds
were inaccessible because the square ground is on privately-owned land,
and the individual owner was not allowing its use. At the time of allotment,
the grounds were usually selected by individual ground members as part of
their allotment. None of the square grounds were reserved under allotment
to the tribe. Due to death, inheritance, partition, or sale, the land upon
which the grounds are located sometimes passed to individuals who were
either non-tribal members or were tribal citizens but anti-grounds. Attempts
to buy or lease these properties were not always successful and at present
there does not appear to be an easy way to force their sale to the Nation for
ceremonial use.
Enforcement of state laws. Again, as some of the stomp grounds are in
private, non-Indian land status, they are subject to state laws. During
summer droughts when a state or county fire ban is issued, it is illegal to
burn outside fires. This creates a direct conflict with the grounds, as the
fireplace is central to the stomp dance ceremonies. In western Oklahoma,
some accommodation has been made for ceremonial fires, such as at Native

217. UNDRIP, supra note 4, art. 24(1). To the extent we have completed them, included
are the Mvskoke translations of these articles. Article 24: “Este catvlke nak emenakuece
tayat ohfvtcv heliswv ton nak sevfvstev vrakkv, momen nak heliswv, vtakrv omakat, ponvttv,
ton ekvnv ofv nak ocakat pumet estomet nak omvlkvt vcayecvke tayen omat meceyvres. Este
catvlke omvlkat naken sevnice tayat omvlkat enakuecet, mowis este vpvlwat omekot eyvnice
yvres nak enoketv cuko ocakat svpvken momen vpopokat.”
218. Id. art. 26(1).
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American Church meetings.219 However, as some of the Mekvlke stated,
they are never going to ask permission of any person to light their fire. The
UNDRIP speaks to the concerns over ceremonial fires and local fire bans in
article 12(1):
Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop
and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and
ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in
privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use
and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the
repatriation of their human remains.220
Fake Indians. A problem common to many tribes is non-Indians
pretending to be Indians and attempting to act as indigenous nations and
peoples. Ben Barnes of the Shawnee Tribe and of White Oak Shawnee
Ceremonial Grounds has worked on these issues concerning individuals and
groups claiming to be Shawnee, particularly in Indiana and Ohio. He argues
that not only do such “Faux” Indians usurp real tribes’ efforts to repatriate
remains of their ancestors, but they also siphon off millions of dollars
meant for real Indians by falsely applying for grants.221 That does not even
address the issue of the “pre-tendians” conducting ceremonial or religious
dances that are only to be conducted by the proper tribal entities, if at all. If
the UNDRIP becomes domesticated into American law, tribes could find
that by tribal law defining bona fide practices/practitioners, those
protections could be incorporated into exterior federal law through article
31(1):
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect
and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and
traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of
their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and
genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties
of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and
traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have
the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their
219. Okla. Forestry Servs., Guidelines for Oklahoma’s Ban on Outdoor Burning (Jan. 30,
2018), http://www.forestry.ok.gov/Websites/forestry/images/Burn%20Bans/Burn%20Ban
%20Guidelines%20January%2030%202018.pdf.
220. UNDRIP, supra note 4, art. 12(1). Mvskoke translation: “Este catvlke omvlkvt nak
futcvn hecken, sem mvhayet, ohhvtaliyet, momen emayetv mvhayet momen nak enkerretv
emonkvrvs.”
221. Barnes, supra note 33, at 8.
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intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional
knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.222
Hickory Ground Desecration in Alabama. Hickory Ground’s last
traditional town site in the east was near Wetumpka, Alabama. Hickory
Town had been the Creek Confederacy Capital prior to removal and was
rediscovered in 1968. The Poarch Band of Creek Indians (PBCI), located in
Alabama, were federally recognized in 1984, and the PBCI promptly
acquired the Hickory site. The PBCI soon built a casino upon the historic
tribal town, dug up the remains of Hickory Ground’s ancestors, and stored
them in plastic boxes in a shed. The remains were finally reinterred around
2016. Upon discovery of the historic site, the Hickory Ground members felt
a traditional duty to care for their ancestors. Hickory Ground and the
Muscogee Nation filed suit against the PBCI.223 Fortunately, after a change
in leadership at the PBCI, it appears the two Creek tribes are now
discussing their issues. Hopefully they will reach an agreement that respects
the duties the MCN Mekvlke owe to their ancestors.224 However, articles 11
and 12 might address such problems when they arise. Article 11(2) states:
States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms,
which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with
indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual,
religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and
informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and
customs.225

222. UNDRIP, supra note 4, art. 31(1). Mvskoke translation: “Este catvlke, ohfvnkv nak
enwikate emetat vfastet, vcayecet, nak emayetv ohhvtaliyet, enkerettv momen emayetv,
emvhakv, catv ocat Este Cate enake ton, nerkv, heliswv, nak onahoyvte, svhocihocvte,
pokketcetv, yvhiketv tofvs emonkares.” This is a fairly literal translation of this article. For
more detailed discussion, see infra Section V.C.
223. Complaint, Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Poarch Creek Band Indians, No. 2:12-CV01079 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 12, 2012).
224. See A Tribal Resolution of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Authorizing the Principal
Chief and Meko George Thompson of Hickory Ground Tribal Town to Execute a
Preservation Agreement Regarding Two Parcels in Elmore County, Alabama (No. MCN TR
17-161, Dec. 4, 2017).
225. UNDRIP, supra note 4, art. 11(2). Mvskoke translation: “Evkvn satkv rakko Este
cate emetvlwv emayetv oca’kat. Em vhakv vhopvnet, vkasvmeko, nake fvtceko mehocvte fektv
oce towares.”
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Article 12(2) states:
States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of
ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession
through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in
conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned.226
C. Adoption of the UNDRIP by the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
In 2016, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation adopted the Muscogee DRIP as
positive law of the Nation. About a third of the MDRIP was translated into
Mvskoke at the time of adoption, primarily those articles dealing with
traditional and sacred issues. Directives were given to translate the
remaining portions. There was a symmetry to the adoption of the MDRIP as
the UNDRIP process had been, at least partially, initiated by a Muscogee
citizen. Some forty years later, and nine years after the U.N. adopted the
Declaration, the Muscogee Nation adopted the MDRIP. As of winter 2019,
the MDRIP is in an ongoing process of translation into Mvskoke, being
about three-quarters completed.
The UNDRIP can fundamentally alter federal Indian law in more ways
than just traditional rights. Article 3 recognizes that indigenous peoples
have the right to self-determination, meaning tribes have an inherent right
to exist and determine their own future, not the United States.227 That,
coupled with the UNDRIP’s consultation requirements, would finally do
away with, or at least greatly limit, the plenary power over tribes. In the
past this power has included the ultimate power of terminating tribes. This,
perhaps more than any other potential outcome, should motivate tribes to
begin the process of pushing the UNDRIP into federal Indian law. This
effort should form the top layer of a two-part effort that sandwiches federal
Indian law between it, the foundational layer of the effort being tribal law
that begins to incorporate human rights internally. If tribal law is to
permeate into federal law, it must first explain tribal conceptions of society
that constitute inherent human rights.
How this might work is shown in the process of translating UNDRIP
article 31(1) into Mvskoke. The translation back into English brings to light
conceptions of Muscogee rights and duties embedded in the language and
culture, thus helping to develop an indigenous jurisprudence. As noted

226. Id. art. 12(2). Mvskoke translation: “Ekvntvcke estecvtvlke nak encahoyate emekvnv
safvcketv monkv este fone cahoyate yokfolecvrvs.”
227. Id. art. 3.
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above, article 31(1) has a Mvskoke translation that is fairly literal;228
however, the Mekvlke discussed this section at length. They felt this
particular directive was the essence of why they saw the need for the
MDRIP: that those things which are ours, spiritually and culturally, should
not be used or shared by others, even within the Muscogee, unless done in
the proper traditional manner.229 Thus, they added an additional translation
of how they understood the meaning of article 31(1):
Hiyomakat pum ayetv pum wihokat vcacvket omet sahkopanetvt
okot omes. (Now this is our ways that was given to us and is very
sacred and is not to be played with.)
By this it is meant that our traditional ways come from a spiritual source.
To conduct them, except when and where one is supposed to, is like one is
mocking them and playing with them like children might play a game. This
should not be done. Certain of these Euchee and Muscogee ways are what
are called “medicine ways” and should not be done except by those who are
authorized to do so pursuant to traditional methods of approval.
Also, as previously discussed, free, prior, and informed consent is an
important component of the UNDRIP.230 In going through the Mvskoke
translation process, the translators agreed that towares was a necessary
component of the Mvskoke phrase. That word’s translation or meaning was
explained as “there is no room for discussion” or “it SHALL be”
(emphatic). They explained that when it is used it means “there is no wiggle
room.” The translators then wondered if this word was used in the Mvskoke
translations of our treaties. If so, then it seemed the tribe’s treaties
obviously were not followed by the United States, as the use of towares is
an imperative statement. This small example of generating internal
discussion of Muscogee terms and conditions becomes a learning
experience of developing traditional understanding. It should lead to an
infusion into federal and international process if properly followed through
by indigenous advocates. However, until others undertake similar projects,
tribal understanding of human rights will continue to flow from exterior
sources, whether federally or internationally derived.
Thus, in the process of going through the UNDRIP, inherent Mvskoke
conceptions of law and prohibitions are drawn out. Things were learned
about the sacred and the profane, as well as responsibility, tribal duty, and
228. See supra note 222.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77 (regarding the Mekvlke submission on
WIPO).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
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history. Traditional jurisprudence must be consciously developed because
both international standards and tribal discourse must be used to imbue
federal law with human rights concerns of indigenous people. This should
be done through articulating indigenous traditional law that shows how
Indian law fails, or is unable, to recognize the rights of native people. 231
This work can thus develop, articulate, and explain traditional law.
Adoption of the MDRIP was noteworthy for the Muscogee Nation. As
with any citizenry, there is complaining about the actions of the
governments. However, in October 2016, the entire elected National
Council of the Muscogee Nation co-sponsored the MDRIP legislation and
passed it unanimously by voice vote. That was a great moment for the
Muscogee Nation because the Nation enacted an approach looking to longterm assertion of its rights. In this it was reminiscent of the work done in
the late 1970s by a small group of Indian lawyers and tribal leaders that
went to the tribal governments in Oklahoma to convince them they had
Indian Country, that they had jurisdiction over that Indian Country, that
they could assert their power over their lands, and that Indians had a right to
tribal courts. The attorneys did not think the tribes were likely to get tribal
courts for many years.232 Despite these doubts, tribal Indian Country was
soon recognized in Oklahoma v. Littlechief,233 which meant tribal
jurisdiction and tribal courts again became a reality in Oklahoma.234 After
the recognition of tribal jurisdiction in Littlechief, tribal courts were quickly
resurrected throughout Oklahoma as tribal leaders asserted tribal
jurisdiction and the right to control affairs within their territory.235

231. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (illustrating current American law not
comprehending traditional jurisprudence conceptions).
232. Prof. G. William Rice, An Overview of Tribal Courts’ Position Within Indian
Country During the Last 30 Years and Thoughts on What They Face in the Future
(presentation at the Muscogee (Creek) Nation District Court CLE Conference, “Doing
Business in Indian Country,” Apr. 30, 2015).
233. 573 P.2d 263, 1978 OK CR 2.
234. “Again” is used because the tribes in Indian and Oklahoma Territories had
established courts prior to their destruction by the federal government as a conscious attempt
to force acceptance of allotment of the tribal lands. See SAC AND FOX CONST. OF 1885, art. V;
MUSCOGEE NATION CONST. OF 1867, art. III.
235. The decision in Littlechief quickly threw tribal jurisdictions into chaos as the Bureau
of Indian Affairs rushed to implement CFR courts for tribes in order to assert some criminal
jurisdiction in the removal of state jurisdiction. Of course, the CFR courts were to be a
stopgap measure until tribal courts could be implemented. CFR courts still operate thirtyfive years later for some tribes and, in some instances, the BIA initially resisted allowing
tribal courts to take over.
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Enactment of the MDRIP or other tribal equivalents could be of similar
importance (though likely a much longer process) in that it fundamentally
shifts the indigenous law dialogue. It creates a formal framework in which
to conceptualize indigenous rights, assert tribes’ right to control their
sovereignty (self-determination in the international sense), recognize rights
to Native institutions, and assert the right to be consulted in processes (free
and prior informed consent) that impact the Indian nations and their
citizens. While tribes already assert these ideals, within federal law they are
based upon fairness, federal statutes, regulations, or treaties. All of these
mechanisms can be undone without tribal input through congressional
plenary power.236
The Muscogee Nation, the fourth largest tribe in the country, has its
elected National Council members, Principal Chief, and Second Chief237 all
expressing their intent to use the MDRIP in their dialogues with state and
federal officials. Ceremonial Mekvlke travel to meetings around the country
discussing the Declaration.238 Perhaps the Muscogee Nation can be an
example to other tribes that they should also use the UNDRIP or a tribal
DRIP. As that begins to happen more frequently, the values expressed in
those documents will become more widely accepted within and external to
Indian Country. Thus, the enactment of the MDRIP by the Muscogee could
be an example of how to begin moving towards a new age for tribal rights.
The Mekvlke Kellyville meeting shows that as the traditional leaders
become aware of the UNDRIP and contemporaneously articulate their
236. These fears are both real and present. In Murphy v. Royal, the Tenth Circuit laid out
the current law: “In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court said Congress has the power
to unilaterally abrogate treaties made with Indian tribes. ‘Congress possesses plenary power
over Indian affairs, including the power to modify or eliminate tribal rights.’” 875 F.3d 896,
917 (10th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted) (quoting South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522
U.S. 329, 343 (1998)). Murphy concerned a habeas petition of a Muscogee citizen
prosecuted in state court for a crime allegedly committed in the Creek reservation. The state
argued there was no longer a reservation, and thus no Indian country, and that state
jurisdiction was therefore proper. The Murphy court found the reservation had not been
disestablished by allotment. However, Indians at the time of this Article fear that either the
United States Supreme Court will reverse or, if upheld in the courts, Congress will intervene
and disestablish or diminish the Creek reservation. These concerns go to both the unilateral
power of Congress and the lack of free, prior, and informed consent regarding issues that so
directly involve tribal and Indian rights.
237. This information comes from discussions with MCN Principal Chief James Floyd.
238. In September 2016, Mekvlke Yargee and Thompson traveled to Hawaii to meet with
the International Treaty Council. In September 2017, Meko Thompson sent one of his
warriors to attend the University of Colorado Law School’s and the United Nations
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues’ celebration of the UNDRIP’s tenth anniversary.
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understanding of traditional law as related to sacred sites, traditional
medicines, land tenure, and heirship, the time is ripe to push these positions
into the UNDRIP. This would institutionalize indigenous interpretations of
the Declaration into external structures. Thus, for instance, a right to
medicines under article 24 of the UNDRIP must be understood in terms of
the needs of indigenous peoples as explained by the concerned traditional
peoples.239 Presentations to the U.N. and requiring national response by the
“State” are important to raising human rights and indigenous consciousness.
However, international advocacy is ultimately not the tool needed to
support continuity of traditional indigenous society. The Declaration needs
to be raised in the federal system, if not as law, then as a moral structure
using human rights standards arguing for the reinterpretation of current
federal Indian law.
VI. This Is Our House
It is no coincidence that Chitto Harjo was from Hickory Ground, whose
current Meko is actively working on the MDRIP. It is not surprising that
Harjo’s righthand man was Charlie Coker, whose great grandson is on the
MCN National Council and helped to introduce the MDRIP legislation. It is
unsurprising that Phillip Deere, the Nuyaka Ground’s medicine man, went
to Geneva, Switzerland, in 1977 to tell the United Nations they must
address indigenous peoples' human rights. Phillip’s daughter was a
translator on the MDRIP and Phillip’s son-in-law is the Alabama Ground
Meko pushing the MDRIP. The traditional people have always understood
cultural integrity and political sovereignty are inextricably linked together.
Federal Indian law fails to recognize our right to develop our own
institutions and utilize our jurisprudence by containing an escape clause for
the federal government through an unconstrained plenary power doctrine.
Ultimately, until this changes, tribal success and the continuance of a
traditional tribal society is a matter of luck, not right.
The UNDRIP now presents a means to alter this equation. The traditional
rules on how we are to conduct ourselves in relation to each other and the
relationship to things which we need to carry on constitute a traditional law.
It is a jurisprudence derived from an internal tribal epistemology regardless
of exterior obstacles or support. While the UNDRIP’s human rights, with
its quintessential inherent right to self-determination, must be domesticated
into federal Indian law, tribes must at the same time work to inculcate their
laws with their traditional jurisprudence and push that understanding up
239. UNDRIP, supra note 4, art. 24.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

74

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

into the federal system. The UNDRIP can aid this process by acting as a
light by which we see our own institutions more clearly. For those who are
part of still-existing traditional structures, the UNDRIP can protect
indigenous structures which we still retain. The Declaration makes that
process easier, but it is only a tool to that end. It is neither the goal nor the
mechanism itself by which our society survives. As the concurrent actions
of exterior recognition of indigenous human rights and internal articulation
are achieved, a jurisregenerative moment in tribal societies becomes
possible. However, Euchee and other tribal societies will only survive
because some refuse to accept exterior restrictions, demanding like Golaha
Millie: this is our house and we will live a Euchee life. We still have places
we can find our law if we seek them before it is too late.
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